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International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa 
Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines 
and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.    
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, 
including:
•	 No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any 
circumstances; 
•	 Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
•	 More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
•	 Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
Preface
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Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War
P
eace agreements may be signed and hostilities 
may cease, but landmines and explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of 
conflict. 
Antipersonnel mines are munitions 
designed to explode from the presence, 
proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle 
mines are munitions designed to explode from the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and 
indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a 
child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced 
during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or 
injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. 
Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate 
as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These 
unstable explosive devices are left behind during and 
after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive 
ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict 
but has been left behind and is no longer effectively 
controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, 
mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal 
definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines. 
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing 
threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, 
footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, 
in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other 
places where people are carrying out their daily activities. 
They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, 
and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the 
repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, 
and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose 
citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but 
have no possibility to farm other land, or take another 
route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when 
medical systems are drained by the cost of attending 
to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must 
spend money clearing mines rather than paying for 
education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause 
appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal 
barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and 
ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in 
areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who 
join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, 
and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They 
must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within 
four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined 
areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. 
In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must 
provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine 
survivors, their families and communities, and support 
for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent 
mine incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for 
taking action, but it is up to governments to implement 
treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments 
to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, 
the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of 
landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians 
can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, 
children can play without mistaking an unexploded 
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the 
social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence 
for decades to come.
© Sean Sutton/MAG, November 2014
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International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, 
working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate 
antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace 
Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in 
recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose 
members share the common goal of working to eliminate 
antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of 
six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, 
Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians 
for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the 
horrendous effects of mines on the communities they 
were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and 
Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even 
prevented their development efforts in these countries. 
They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed 
to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the 
solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the 
international campaign practical experience of the 
impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective 
of the different sectors they represented: human rights, 
children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, 
and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member 
campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word 
through their networks; news of this new coalition and 
the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines 
soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries 
to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need 
for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to 
enable them to be effective advocates in their respective 
countries.   
Campaign members worked at the local, national, 
regional, and global level to encourage their governments 
to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew 
rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 
countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 
3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the 
sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the 
Mine Ban Treaty became a reality. 
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve 
with changing circumstances. The early days of the 
campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive 
treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was 
achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries 
join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement 
their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also 
encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty 
obligations within a decade, a target agreed in the 2014 
Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against 
mine use and advocates for countries who have not 
joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign 
also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit 
of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which 
provides the most effective framework for eliminating 
antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in 
partnership with governments and international 
organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, 
from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. 
The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong 
campaigns. In the few years prior to the merger, the 
ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor had increasingly been 
sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the 
world of landmines and cluster munitions. The merger 
has strengthened the work toward these goals while still 
ensuring that the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the 
Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their 
distinct areas of work. The ICBL-CMC is committed to 
pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel 
mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been 
successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and 
flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other 
NGOs, international organizations, and governments. 
Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides 
research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC 
and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the 
de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty 
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors 
and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and 
compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the 
international community’s response to the humanitarian 
problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and 
other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor 
represents the first time that NGOs have come together 
in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to 
monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and 
to regularly document progress and problems, thereby 
successfully putting into practice the concept of civil 
society-based verification.
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor 
as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also 
functionally became the research and monitoring arm of 
the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from 
Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased 
reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for 
the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring 
and Research Committee, a standing committee of the 
ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces 
and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition 
Monitor as separate publications.
 v
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The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a 
formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society 
to hold governments accountable to the obligations 
they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines 
and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive 
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available 
information. Although in some cases it does entail 
investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to 
send researchers into harm’s way and does not include 
hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements the transparency 
reporting by states required under international treaties. 
It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, 
and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the 
successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster 
munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established 
in recognition of the need for independent reporting and 
evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion 
on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and 
to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free 
of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works 
in good faith to provide factual information about issues 
it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international 
community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting 
network and an annual report. A network of more than 
30 researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered 
information to prepare this report. The researchers come 
from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and 
from other elements of civil society, including journalists, 
academics, and research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done 
by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor 
acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by 
the time, resources, and information sources available. 
The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, 
corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and 
corrections from governments and others are sought, 
in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important 
subject.
About this report
This is the 17th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is 
the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor 
report, first published in November 2010. Landmine 
Monitor 2015 provides a global overview of the landmine 
situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries 
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at 
www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, 
production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the 
world, and also includes information on contamination, 
clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for 
mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2014, 





A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and 
organizations produced this report. It was assembled by 
a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, 
with the support of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor 
website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful 
to everyone who contributed research to this report. 
We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, 
NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, 
and governments who provided us with essential 
information. We are grateful to ICBL and CMC staff for 
their review of the content of the report, and their crucial 
assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and 
promotion of Monitor reports.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor 
lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a 
standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board 
comprised of four NGOs as well as Monitor research 
team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s 
members include: DanChurchAid (Richard MacCormac), 
Handicap International (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), 
Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Mines Action 
Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty 
and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer 
(ICBL-CMC government liaison and policy manager), 
and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). Megan 
Burke (ICBL-CMC director) is an ex-officio member. 
From January to November 2015, the Monitor’s Editorial 
Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and 
produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2015. 
The Editorial Team included:
• Ban policy: Mark Hiznay (ban policy lead), Stephen 
Goose, Andrew Haag, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, 
and Mary Wareham with assistance from Robert 
Pattilo and Marion Loddo;
• Contamination and clearance: Jennifer Reeves and 
Marion Loddo;  and
• Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi 
Vicentic, Erin Hunt, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, 
Marie-Josée Hamel, Michael Moore, and Marianne 
Schulze.
The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions 
of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted the 
majority of mine action research performed in 2015 and 
shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for 
the findings presented here. 
Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in 
November 2015 with assistance from Morgan McKenna 
(publications consultant). 
Report formatting was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. 
Imprimerie Minute printed the report in Switzerland. 
Rafael Jiménez provided the cover design. This report 
was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
• Government of Australia
• Government of Denmark
• Government of France
• Government of Germany
• Government of Norway
• Government of Sweden
• Government of Switzerland
• Holy See 
• UNICEF
• UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible 
for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material 
contained in this report. We also thank the donors 
who have contributed to the organizational members 
of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other 
participating organizations.
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L
andmine Monitor 2015 details continued progress 
toward the goal of a mine-free world, but also 
finds challenges with non-state armed groups 
using landmines in more countries and a one-
year rise in global casualties. While the Monitor 
reports an increase in clearing mine-affected 
areas in 2014, many states remain behind on 
their clearance plans and global funding for mine action 
declined for a second year in a row.
Treaty Status
There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and 
one signatory—Marshall Islands—that has yet to ratify.
Use
From October 2014 through October 2015, the 
government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and 
Syria—all states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty—used 
antipersonnel landmines. 
•	 North Korea denied emplacing new landmines along 
a South Korean patrol route in the demilitarized zone 
between the two countries, but a UN Command 
Military Armistice Commission investigation 
concluded otherwise in an August 2015 report.
•	 Recent Syrian government use was first 
documented in 2011, whereas use by the 
government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has 
been documented annually by the Monitor since 
1999. However, available information indicates 
that new mine use in Myanmar has been at a 
significantly lower level over the past several years.
Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines or 
victim-activated improvised explosive devices acting 
as antipersonnel mines in 10 countries: Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, and Yemen, a significant increase.
•	 The last time the Monitor reported 10 or more 
countries in which non-state armed groups 
used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices was 2006. 
There was no confirmed new use of antipersonnel 
landmines by a State Party during the reporting 
period. The Treaty’s new Committee on Cooperative 
Compliance met with representatives of States Parties 
Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey, and Yemen to engage each in 
a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of past 
use of antipersonnel mines, in some cases dating back 
to 2008.
Casualties
In 2014, recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-
activated improvised explosive devices that act as 
antipersonnel mines, cluster munition remnants, and 
other explosive remnants of war (ERW) rose compared 
to 2013, but was the second lowest annual total since the 
Monitor started recording casualties in 1999. 
•	 In 2014, a global total of 3,678 casualties were 
recorded, a 12% increase compared with the total 
of 3,308 in 2013.
•	 The incidence rate of 10 casualties per day for 2014 
is about 40% of that reported in 1999, when there 
were approximately 25 casualties each day.
•	 In many states and areas, numerous casualties 
go unrecorded, especially in conflict settings; 
therefore, the true casualty figure is anticipated 
to be much higher. Nevertheless, the decrease in 
casualties recorded since the entry of the Mine 
Ban Treaty is even more significant because of 
improvements in recording over time.
Casualties were identified in 54 states and four other 
areas in 2014, of which 37 are States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty.
•	 The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW 
casualties were civilians (80%) where their status 
was known, which is nearly identical to 2013.
•	 In 2014, children accounted for 39% of all civilian 
casualties where the age was known.
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Major Findings
•	 Women and girls made up 12% of all casualties where 
the sex was known, the same as in 2012 and 2013. 
•	 Seventy percent of recorded global casualties 
occurred in States Parties.
•	 Afghanistan experienced the greatest single rise in 
casualties, with 1,296 recorded in 2014 compared to 
1,050 in 2013. The bulk of the increase was due to 
victim-activated improvised explosive devices, with 
809 recorded in 2014 compared to 567 in 2013.
•	 In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and 
victim-activated improvised explosive devices 
acting as antipersonnel mines caused the majority 
of all casualties (49% combined).
•	 The proportion of casualties caused by victim-
activated improvised explosive devices increased 
significantly (to 31%, up from 22% in 2013), with 
the casualties in Afghanistan accounting for the 
majority of the increase. 
Contamination and Land 
Release
Fifty-seven states and four other areas have an identified 
threat of antipersonnel mine contamination as of October 
2015, including 33 States Parties and 24 states not party. A 
further five States Parties have either suspected or residual 
mine contamination. At least 200km2 of land was reported 
to be cleared of landmines in 2014, an increase from an 
estimated 185km2 in 2013—destroying more than 230,000 
antipersonnel and 11,500 antivehicle mines
•	 As in 2013, the largest total clearance of mined 
areas in 2014 was achieved in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted 
for 75% of recorded clearance.
•	 Over the past five years, approximately 976km2 
of mined areas have been cleared and nearly 1.48 
million antipersonnel mines and more than 82,000 
antivehicle mines have been destroyed.
In 2014, Burundi completed clearance of its suspected 
mined areas and Mozambique declared itself free of 
landmines in September 2015.
•	 As of November 2015, 29 states and one other area 
have declared themselves cleared of mines since 
the treaty entered into force in 1999.
•	 Oman declared for the first time that it has 
areas suspected of being contaminated with 
antipersonnel mines in its initial Article 7 
transparency report, and therefore has been 
added to the list of contaminated States Parties. 
New antipersonnel contamination arising in 
Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of 
contaminated States Parties.
•	 Of the 33 States Parties that have confirmed 
outstanding mine clearance obligations, 27 have 
been granted at least one extension period, but 
only three States Parties appear to be on track to 
meet their Article 5 clearance deadlines. 
•	 In 2014, four States Parties submitted extension 
requests, all of which were approved at the Third 
Review Conference: Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In 2015, 
four States Parties submitted extension requests: 
Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal. These 
are awaiting approval at the Fourteenth Meeting 
of States Parties to be held 30 November to 4 
December 2015. 
•	 Massive antipersonnel mine contamination, 
defined by the Monitor as more than 100km2, 
is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, and Turkey, as well 
as Western Sahara. Increased use of land release 
methodologies—technical and non-technical 
surveys—have improved the understanding of the 
remaining mine contamination in many countries.
Support for Mine Action
Donors and affected states together contributed 
approximately US$610 million in international and 
national support for mine action in 2014, a decrease of 
$30 million (5%) from 2013 and the second year in a row 
of declining support.
International assistance in 2014 was $417 million, a 
decrease of $23 million from 2013.
•	 A total of 42 states and three other areas received 
support from 33 donors. 
•	 Contributions from the top five mine action 
donors—the United States, the European Union, 
Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted 
for 72% of all donor funding. 
•	 This is the ninth consecutive year that international 
contributions for mine action have totaled more 
than $400 million.
•	 Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan 
dropped considerably, from $68 million in 2013 
to $49 million in 2014, although it was still 30% 
higher than funding received by the second largest 
recipient (Lao PDR: $37 million).
•	 The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao 
PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45% 
of all international contributions. 
•	 International funding was distributed among the 
following sectors: clearance and risk education 
(68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), 
advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and 
stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining 
16% was not disaggregated by the donors.
Thirteen affected states provided $194 million in national 
support for their own mine action programs, $7 million 
less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected 
countries reported contributing $201 million.
In addition to those contributions, appropriations 
from the UN General Assembly for mine action within 
peacekeeping operations provided $166 million in 2014, 
an increase of 10% compared with 2013.
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Victim Assistance
Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with 
significant numbers of mine victims made considerable 
progress in victim assistance under the Cartagena Action 
Plan (2009–2014) and continued to do so under the 
Maputo Action Plan Action (2014–2019), but still face 
many challenges. Findings detailed below relate to the 31 
States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.
•	 Through survey, understanding of the needs of 
mine victims continued to improve in more than 
half of the States Parties.
•	 Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties 
had active coordination mechanisms or relevant 
national plans in place to advance efforts to assist 
mine victims and uphold their rights. However, 
expired action plans for assistance in Afghanistan 
and Sudan had not yet been updated, while several 
States Parties plans remained inactive or in draft: 
Algeria, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen.
•	 In most of the States Parties, assistance efforts 
have been integrated into other disability rights 
and development efforts, through collaborative 
coordination, combined planning, and survivor 
participation. However, victim assistance coordination 
efforts stalled in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
•	 In nearly all of the States Parties, survivors were 
joining in coordination processes that affect their 
lives, although in many countries their participation 
must be better supported, especially in decision-
making roles.
•	 More than half of the States Parties had included 
some information on victim assistance activities 
and progress in their formal reports covering 
calendar year 2014.
Stockpile Destruction
Collectively, the States Parties have destroyed more than 
49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including 
more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014.
•	 Finland completed destruction of its stockpile of 
one million mines during the reporting period.
•	 More than nine million antipersonnel mines await 
destruction by six States Parties.
•	 Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation 
of the treaty after having failed to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year 
deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 
1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 
June 2010.
Transfer and Production
For the past decade, the global trade in antipersonnel 
mines has consisted of a low level of illicit and 
unacknowledged transfers, but the appearance of mines 
in Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen indicates that some form 
of market for, and trade in, antipersonnel mines exists.
•	 At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
including six landmine producers, have enacted 
formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel 
mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United 
States.
Down from a total of more than 50 producing states 
before the Mine Ban Treaty’s existence, currently 
only 11 states are identified as potential producers of 
antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Vietnam.
•	 Active production may be ongoing in as few as four 
countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South 
Korea.
Non-state armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, 
Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce 
antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-
activated improvised explosive devices.
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n these uncertain times, universal adherence to 
the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian and disarma-
ment provisions matters more than ever. Non-state 
armed groups (NSAGs) in 10 countries have used 
landmines in the past year (October 2014–October 
2015), usually victim-activated improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) rather than manufactured mines. The 
new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in 
Ukraine and Yemen and the continuing large-scale use of 
victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq are partic-
ularly disturbing.
Yet new use of antipersonnel mines by states 
remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use by the 
government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria 
in the past year. 
States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban 
Treaty and the same can be said of the vast majority of the 
35 countries that remain outside it, as they also appear to 
abide by the Treaty’s key provisions despite not acceding. 
Several States Parties continue to face serious 
compliance concerns, particularly with respect to missed 
stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine 
clearance deadline extensions.1 However, governments 
and international organizations, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continue to work 
together to support those facing challenges. The Mine 
Ban Treaty’s newly formed Committee on Cooperative 
Compliance has been diligently following-up on past 
allegations of landmine use by States Parties.
This shows the enduring and popular support for the 
Mine Ban Treaty, which was adopted on 18 September 
1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999. There are 
now a total of 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; 
most recently Oman acceded in August 2014.
1 For details on extension requests, please see the Mine Action chapter 
of this publication.
Use of antipersonnel landmines
In this reporting period—October 2014 through 
October 2015—the Monitor has confirmed new use 
of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of 
Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria and by NSAGs in 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
This is a significant increase of use by NSAGs from 
recent years, especially in States Parties.2
Locations of antipersonnel mine and 




















Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are in bold.
Use in States Parties 
Yemen
Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah, emplaced 
antipersonnel landmines in the Yemeni port of Aden before 
withdrawing from the city in July 2015. Yemen had declared 
the completion of mine clearance in Aden in 2009.3
According to the information from Yemeni mine 
action officials, the emergency clearance of landmines 
2 NSAGs used mines in at least seven countries in 2013–2014, eight 
countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 
2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine coun-
tries in 2007. 
3 Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Management System Officer, 
Operations Department, Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 20 May 
2010.
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and explosive remnants of war (ERW) began on 11 July 
2015 in several residential districts of Aden previously 
controlled by Houthi forces, including Khormaksar, 
Jaulaa, and Green City in the Dar Saad neighborhood, 
as well as Bir Ahmad and Amran in al-Buraika, also near 
Aden. By 12 August 2015, the teams had removed 91 
antipersonnel mines of two types from Aden as well as 
316 IEDs, 666 antivehicle mines, and various ERW.4
The two types of antipersonnel mines cleared from 
Aden were the PPM-2 (manufactured in the former East 
Germany) and a GYATA-64 (previously manufactured in 
Hungary).5 In its transparency reports since 2000, Yemen 
has never reported either of these mine types as stockpiled 
or retained. It was first reported that these antipersonnel 
mines had been seen in Yemen in April 2013.6 Also 
present in Aden were TM-62 and TM-57 antivehicle mines 
manufactured in the former Soviet Union.
The NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which 
provides emergency medical care in Aden, reported 
more than 35 people injured, mostly children, between 
early August and mid-September.7
Ukraine
In June 2015, Ukrainian representatives estimated that 
8% of eastern Ukraine is either affected or suspected to 
be affected by antipersonnel mines and IEDs as well as 
ERW from the conflict between Ukrainian government 
forces and Russian-backed rebels that erupted in early 
2014—initially in Crimea in the south, then in Ukraine’s 
eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.8 There is not 
believed to have been any significant landmine use since 
the February 2015 ceasefire.
Multiple broadcast media reports by Russian 
television outlets clearly show that antipersonnel mines 
4 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Press Release, “Yemen: Houthis 
Used Landmines in Aden,” 5 September 2015, www.hrw.org/
news/2015/09/05/yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden. Unless oth-
erwise noted all information in this section is from this release.
5 PPM-2 and GYATA-64 mines have been used elsewhere in Yemen 
in recent years. Foreign Policy reported that in late 2011, Republican 
Guard forces laid approximately 8,000 landmines, including GYATA-64 
and PPM-2 mines, at Bani Jarmooz. Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Land-
mines of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy, 25 May 2013, foreignpolicy.
com/2013/05/25/revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/. Human 
Rights Watch also recorded the use of PPM-2 mines in Sanaa, one 
of which maimed a 10-year-old boy on 4 March 2012. ICBL-CMC, 
“Country Profile: Yemen: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 December 2013, www.
the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2013/yemen/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
6 During a visit to Bani Jormooz in April 2013, an international jour-
nalist said “residents produced bags of mines recovered from the 
ground using rudimentary methods. They included four different 
types of anti-personnel mines, including large numbers of Hungarian 
manufactured GYATA-64 type mines, known to be among the most 
powerful anti-personnel devices ever manufactured. Locals also pro-
duced plastic East German PPM2 mines and two variations of Soviet 
wooden PMD-5 [sic] landmines—all were manufactured before the 
end of the Cold War.” Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab 
Spring,” Foreign Policy, 25 May 2013, foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/25/
revenge-landmines-of-the-arab-spring/.
7 Human Rights Watch Press Release, "Houthis Used Landmines 
in Aden," 5 September 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/
yemen-houthis-used-landmines-aden.
8 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COM-
MITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.
and multipurpose munitions equipped with victim-
activated fuzes were used by Russian-backed rebels. In 
June 2015, the Russian television network Russia 1 aired a 
report showing members of the rebel “Spartak Battalion” 
emplacing MON-50 mines with MUV fuzes and tripwires 
near Marinka in Donetsk province.9 On 17 November 
2014, a Ukrainian media report highlighted that 
Ukrainian security forces seized equipment purportedly 
in possession of a rebel sabotage group operating in 
government-controlled territory in the Kharkov region.10 
Their equipment included MON-50 and OZM-72 
mines along with mechanical pull MUV fuzes, tripwire 
assemblies, and electrical initiation devices.
This equipment includes factory-produced 
antipersonnel mines never stockpiled or previously 
destroyed by the Ukrainian government. A video 
produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014, 
shows combatants associated with the rebel Zarya 
Battalion emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in 
conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines 
at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine.11 This type of 
mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine 
and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993.12
Victim-activated booby-traps have also been used, 
however, it is unclear who is responsible. The “Raising 
Red Flags” report by Armament Research Services 
presents on page 61 a photograph, provided by Vice 
News reporter Harriet Salem, of an RGD-5 hand grenade 
taped to a tree and fitted with an UZRGM-type fuze 
affixed to a trip wire.13 Victim-activated booby-traps and 
victim-activated IEDs are banned by the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty.
Additionally, both sides have used several types 
of hand-emplaced antivehicle mines and Ukrainian 
government forces have used remotely-delivered 
PTM-1G antivehicle mines. Ukraine admitted in June 
2015 that its forces emplaced antivehicle mines but noted 
that the locations are fixed with reference to at least 
two indestructible landmarks, fenced off, and marked 
with special signs, and that records of mined areas are 
distributed in no less than three copies.14
In June 2014 and June 2015, the government of 
Ukraine declared in statements to Mine Ban Treaty 
States Parties that it had not used antipersonnel 
9 “Репортаж с линии соприкосновения в ДНР : Боестолкновения 
с украми и установка растяжек,” YouTube, 14 June 2015, youtu.be/
H0KmJq9cww0.
10 “Особо опасная группа из 12 диверсантов, причастная ко взрыву 




11 “Жизнь батальона Заря Часть 7 Минирование Life of Zarya battalion,” 
YouTube, 31 July 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqSsgLNaJuo.
12 “Противопехотная мина ПМН-4,” Saper, n.d., undated, www.saper.
etel.ru/mines-2/pmn-4.html.
13 Armament Research Services, “Raising Red Flags: An Examination 
of Arms and Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine, 2014,” 
November 2014, p. 61. 
14 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebancon-
vention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.
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landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces 
of laying landmines in Ukraine.15 Information provided 
in December 2014 by Ukrainian government officials 
states, “no banned weapons” had been used in the 
“Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed 
forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer 
battalions.16
Representatives of Ukraine stated in June 2015 that 
retained or stockpiled antipersonnel mines under their 
control are not available for issue to troops and remain 
strictly controlled by the high command.17 They did admit 
however, that some mines were stored in the Crimea and 
are no longer under Ukrainian government control. 
The ICBL has expressed concern at reports of use and 
seizures of landmines in Ukraine.18 It urges parties to the 
conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used 
by any actor and to destroy any antipersonnel mines they 
have seized or otherwise acquired.
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan has experienced extensive use of victim-
activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the 
Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which oppose the 
government. In September 2015, Afghan officials said 
that the Taliban had recently laid landmines and booby-
traps around Kunduz after seizing the city.19 The UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported 
15 Ibid.; and submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Con-
ference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, www.maputoreviewcon-
ference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf.
16 The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been 
undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges 
containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with 
PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S anti-
personnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruc-
tion in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.
17 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebancon-
vention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.
18 “Troubling Reports of Landmines Seizures and Use in Eastern 
Ukraine,” ICBL, 8 July 2014, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/
news/2014/troubling-reports-of-landmine-seizures-and-use-in-east-
ern-ukraine.aspx.
19 “Afghan forces struggle to retake Kunduz city from Taliban,” The Express 
Tribune (AFP), 30 September 2015, tribune.com.pk/story/964837/
afghan-forces-struggle-to-retake-kunduz-city-from-taliban/.
that anti-government forces were using victim-activated 
IEDs in increasing numbers during early 2015. It 
documented new use of victim-activated IEDs in Kunduz 
in April, May, and June 2015, resulting in new civilian 
casualties. UNAMA has stated that victim-activated IEDs 
are the most common form of IED currently being used 
in Afghanistan. Victim-activated (pressure plate) IEDs 
were responsible for almost half of the casualties from 
explosive weapons recorded during the first half of 2015.20
Colombia 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) continues to 
use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis near 
their campsites or bases, on main transit routes, and around 
caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing.21
Iraq 
Islamic State and possibly other forces fighting the 
government of Iraq have used IEDs and explosive booby-
traps extensively since 2014.22 The extent to which the IEDs 
are command-detonated or victim-activated is not clear. 
In June 2015, Iraq blamed “terrorist armed groups 
and Daesh” (Islamic State) for “a dramatic increase in 
the number of mines, UXOs [unexploded ordinance] 
and IEDs” in the country.23 In May 2015, Reuters reported 
that Islamic State fighters laid landmines in Ramadi, the 
20 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2015 Protection of Civil-
ians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, August 2015, pp. 8, 11, 30, 45, bit.ly/
LM15Banf20. For additional information, see the Casualties and Victim 
Assistance chapter of this publication.
21 June 2014–June 2015 media tracking of landmine use in Colombia 
by Camilo Serna, Operational Coordinator and Monitor Researcher, 
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), emailed to the 
Monitor on 11 July 2015. Media database of new use, unknown use, 
and seizures with 200 entries from the following Colombian media 
sources: El Tiempo, Ejército Nacional, RCN Radio, El País, La Opinión, 
La Voz del Cinaruco, El Líder, El Espectador, UARIV, HSB Noticias, 
PAICMA, Diario del Huila, El Colombiano, Crónica del Quindío, La 
Nación, El Nuevo Día, and Vanguardia.
22 See for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” IRIN, 6 
November 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100797/isis-s-latest-threat-
laying-landmines; and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,” 
Buzzfeed, 19 March 2015, http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-
hidden-enemy-in-iraq#.wu97dG1lX.
23 Statement of Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee 
Meetings, 25 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2c_ARTICLE_5_COMMITTEE_-_Iraq.pdf.
Landmines reported in Ukraine since 2014
Category Designation Origin Type Initiation
Antipersonnel MON-50 Russia/USSR Fragmentation Tripwire/command
MON-90 Russia/USSR Fragmentation Tripwire/command
MON-100 Russia/USSR Fragmentation Tripwire/command
OZM-72 Russia/USSR Fragmentation Tripwire/command
PMN-4 Russia Blast Pressure
POM-2/POM-2R Russia/USSR Fragmentation Tripwire/self-destruct
Antivehicle TM-62M Russia/USSR Blast Pressure
PTM-1G Russia/USSR Blast Pressure/self-destruct
Antilanding PDM-1M Russia/USSR Blast Tilt rod
Note: Use of a tripwire to initiate any explosive device is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
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capital of Iraq’s western desert province of Anbar.24 The 
NGO Conflict Armament Research stated in April 2015 
that Islamic State forces are producing and deploying 
IEDs on an industrial scale.25
Tunisia
New casualties, due to victim-activated explosives among 
the Tunisian military engaged in operations against 
militants in Jebel Al-Cha’anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine 
governorate near the Algerian border, continued to occur. 
In December 2014, one government soldier was killed 
and one injured by a landmine explosion on Mount 
Samama in Kasserine governorate.26 In August 2015, 
two soldiers were killed by landmines during an army 
operation on Mount Mghila in the Kasserine region.27 
Due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely many 
of these devices were recently emplaced.
Use in states not party
North Korea
On 4 August 2015, two South Korean soldiers on patrol 
on the South Korean side of the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were injured 
by newly laid antipersonnel mines. One soldier had both 
legs amputated while the other lost his foot. The South 
Korean military accused North Korea of laying the mines, 
which were identified as PMD-6 wooden box mines made 
in North Korea.28
North Korea issued a denial of use, stating it only 
used mines in self-defense.29 At a press conference in 
New York on 21 August, the North Korean ambassador 
asserted that the South Korean military had identified 
the mine as an M-14 on 4 August and then changed it 
to a North Korean box mine on 10 August for political 
purposes.30
An investigation by the United States (US)-led UN 
Command’s Military Armistice Commission examined 
the area after the incident and issued a report that 
concluded that “the North Korean People’s Army violated 
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Armistice Agreement by 
24 “Iraqi forces say thwart Islamist attack near Ramadi,” 
Reuters, 20 May 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/
us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0O50LP20150520.
25 Forum on the Arms Trade and Stimson Center, “Tracking arms in con-
flict: Lessons from Syria and Iraq,” 7 April 2015, www.forumarmstrade.
org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7_findings_final.pdf.
26 “One Tunisian soldier killed in landmine explosion near Algerian 
borders,” Shanghai Daily, 2 December 2014, www.shanghaidaily.com/
article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=255987.
27 “Two soldiers killed by landmine in west Tunisia,” The Guardian, 
18 August 2015, www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/08/
two-soldiers-killed-by-landmine-in-west-tunisia/.
28 This particular type of mine has been found frequently in South Korea 
and on its coastal islands. In 2010, a South Korean man was killed by 
the same type of mine in the neighboring county in Gyeonggi Province. 
See Landmine Monitor 2011.
29 “North Korea Rejects Landmine Blasts Blame,” Sky 
News, 14 August 2015, news.sky.com/story/1535725/
north-korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame.
30 “North Korea Ambassador’s August 21, 2015 Opening Statement at 
UN Press Conference,” Scribd.com, www.scribd.com/doc/275521285/
North-Korea-Ambassador-s-August-21-2015-Opening-Statement-at-
UN-Press-Conference.
emplacing wooden box land mines along a known 
Republic of Korea patrol route.” According to the report, 
the investigation determined that “the devices were 
recently emplaced” and not “legacy landmines which 
had drifted from their original placements due to rain or 
shifting soil.”31
Syria
In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian 
government mine use in the country’s border areas.32 
A Syrian official acknowledged the government had 
“undertaken many measures to control the borders, 
including planting mines.”33
The Islamic State, rebel groups, and the regime in 
Syria continue to use IEDs and landmines, which has 
led to many civilian and non-civilian deaths. These are 
frequently reported as “roadside bombs,” but also 
include victim-activated devices. According to the 
Violations Documentation Center for Syria, there were 
24 non-civilian deaths and 67 civilian deaths from 
landmines between October 2014 and October 2015.34 
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also reported 
67 civilian deaths from this time period from landmines, 
but noted that there were 53 non-civilian deaths, and nine 
unspecified individual deaths.35
Human Rights Watch reported that at least 70 mine 
explosions occurred in the Tel Shair corridor along the 
Syrian-Turkish border near Kobani between 15 September 
and 15 November 2014, killing at least three civilians, 
including two children, and injuring nine others. 
Photographs taken by humanitarian workers show what 
appear to be US-made M2 bounding antipersonnel 
mines that were allegedly found in the minefields 
north of Kobani, which lie in Turkish territory and fall 
under Turkey’s obligations as a State Party to the Mine 
Ban Treaty to destroy all antipersonnel landmines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as 
possible.36 
Photographs and a video posted online by the Syrian 
Center for Demining Rehabilitation on 28 September 
2015, allegedly filmed west of Daraa in southern Syria, 
show up to 20 PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being 
31 US Forces Korea Press Release, “United Nations Command Military 
Armistice Commission Investigates land mine detonation in demili-
tarized zone,” 13 August 2015, www.usfk.mil/Media/PressReleases/
tabid/12661/Article/613531/united-nations-command-military-armi-
stice-commission-investigates-land-mine-det.aspx.
32 ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces 
laying mines,” 2 November 2011, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-
events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.
aspx.
33 “Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” Haaretz, (The 
Associated Press), 1 November 2011, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/
assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200.
34 Violations Documentation Center in Syria, “Martyrs,” undated, 
www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs.
35 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Reports,” undated, 
www.syriahr.com/en/category/coverages-of-observatory/reports/.
36 Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Syria/Turkey: Landmines 
Kill Civilians Fleeing Kobani,” 2 December 2014, www.hrw.org/
news/2014/12/02/syria/turkey-landmines-kill-civilians-fleeing-kobani.
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removed from the ground.37 This was the first evidence 
of use of the PMN-4 in the Syria conflict, but it is unclear 
who laid them or when. Markings on the mines indicate 
they were manufactured in Russia in 1995.
A video posted to YouTube on 12 October 2015 by 
“the First Brigade,” which specializes in demining, shows 
bounding antipersonnel mines as well as antivehicle 
mines reportedly cleared in Daraa.38
A video released by PYD in February 2015 following 
the cessation of fighting in Kobani shows victim-activated 
IEDs in buildings, allegedly in Kobani.39
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, 
Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the 
use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and 
NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this 
reporting period, information available to the Monitor 
indicates a continuation of the trend of a significantly 
lower level of new mine use.
In March 2015, the inhabitants of Pyin Soe village 
in the eastern Paletwa township of Chin State, near the 
border with Bangladesh, fled after they were warned by 
soldiers from Light Infantry Brigade 289 not to go beyond 
a stream near their village because the government 
soldiers had laid mines on the other bank.40 In September 
2015, Myanmar Army soldiers asked villagers to take 
them to a frontline location in Momauk township at 
which point the soldiers laid mines and warned them not 
to return to the area.41
Antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs has apparently 
decreased significantly since 2012 when many armed 
groups began to engage in negotiations on a nationwide 
ceasefire, which some, but not all, signed in October 
2015.42 In March 2015, villagers from Pyin Soe village 
reported that they saw the Arakan Army (AA) lay mines 
near the edges of their village during conflict between 
the AA and the Myanmar Army.43 In May 2015, the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) sent a letter to several villages 
in Mogaung township notifying them that new mines 
were being laid there. In December 2014, the government 
published allegations of landmine use by the KIA, and 
 ةنيدمب يقرشلا يحلا يف ماظنلا تاوق اهتعرز يتلا ماغلألا ةلازأ 2015 9 28“ 37
 .YouTube, 28 September 2015, youtu.be/-gXJIy3Et0k ”,اعرد فيرب
See also, Armament Research Services, “Russian PMN-4 anti-per-
sonnel landmines in Syria,” 1 October 2015, armamentresearch.com/
russian-pmn-4-anti-personnel-landmines-in-syria/.
 لماعتلا و ماغلألا عزنب ةصتخم ةبيتك لوأ || ةنسلا دوسأ ةقرف || زيمم“ 38
.YouTube, 12 October 2015, youtu.be/mncW58ni8N4 ”,اهعم
-YouTube, 14 Feb ",شعاد يباهرا تاخخفمو ماغلا نيب ينابوك يلاها ةايح" 39
ruary 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OgzXaRfRKw
40 Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict 
in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, www.chro.ca/
images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf.
41 Monitor interview with humanitarian organizations working with con-
flict-displaced communities in Kachin state, Yangon, 9 and 13 October 
2015. Informants requested anonymity.
42 For more details, see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Myanmar: Mine Ban 
Policy,” 27 October 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/
myanmar_burma/mine-ban-policy.aspx. 
43 Chin Human Rights Organization, “Thematic Briefing: Armed conflict 
in Paletwa, southern Chin State,” 15 June 2015, p. 7, www.chro.ca/
images/stories/files/PDF/ArmedConflict_Paletwa_eng.pdf.
stated that 10 people had died and 37 were injured due 
to KIA-laid mines between October 2013 and November 
2014.44
Libya
Reports emerged in September 2014 alleging new use 
of antipersonnel mines at Tripoli International Airport, 
which saw fighting in July–August between the Zintan 
alliance of militia groups and forces of the Libya Dawn 
Alliance.45 Antipersonnel mines were likely laid in 2014 
and not earlier, but the party responsible for the use 
could not be determined.46 On 29 October, Human 
Rights Watch spoke by telephone with the commander 
of the Misrata Revolutionaries engineering unit within 
the Libya Dawn Alliance that had been responsible for 
clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance in 
Tripoli since August. The commander said that on 24 
August 2014, the day of the airport takeover, his unit 
had discovered a mined area of the airport.47 He said a 
pickup truck mounted with anti-aircraft weapons entered 
the “old airport area” and detonated a mine, killing one 
fighter from the Misrata Umm al-Maarek brigade and 
wounding several others. 
Pakistan
The government reported in March 2015 that 
antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the 
country and attributed responsibility for the use to 
“terrorists.”48 Media reports have registered a large 
number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, 
in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-
West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and 
security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with 
Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents. 
44 “Locals speak of KIA’s acts,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 8 December 
2014, p. 9.
45 Video footage reportedly filmed in September at Tripoli International 
Airport by Alnabaa—a private Libyan satellite TV network—and by Al 
Jazeera shows the clearance of at least 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines 
and at least one PRB M3 antivehicle mine. Reports by both TV networks 
alleged that the mines were laid by the Zintani-led forces. “MOHAM-
MEDNAJEM MINES IN TRIPOLI AIRPORT,” YouTube, 31 August 2014, 
youtu.be/1iuDv4vwvHk?t=1m3s; and “عزنب أدبت ايبيل رجف تاوق 
.YouTube, 31 August 2014, www.youtube ”,سلبارط راطم طيحمب ماغلألا
com/watch?v=g1yZ1rW_vrI&feature=youtu.be&t=1m32s.
46 Human Rights Watch, “Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli,” 5 
November 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-new-
landmine-use-tripoli. The Zintan alliance of militia groups, a coali-
tion of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan, controlled 
Tripoli Airport from the end of the 2011 until 24 August 2014, when 
Libya Dawn Alliance of militias from the coastal city of Misrata seized 
control, after five weeks of intense fighting. At the time of fighting, 
a Zintani force known as the Airport Security Katiba was controlling 
Tripoli Airport and its vicinity.
47 The commander informed Human Rights Watch that his unit has 
found and cleared approximately 600 landmines since 24 August, 
mostly T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines, from the Tripoli International 
airport compound.
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Other reports
Additionally, reports of “landmine” use by Boko Haram 
militants in the Sambisa Forest of Nigeria have been 
published in the media since May 2014. For example, two 
soldiers were killed and two others were injured when troops 
of 5th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Brigade encountered 
“landmines” buried by Boko Haram while advancing 
towards Dikwa, Borno State, according to a Nigerian 
Army spokesperson.49 He also said the militants converted 
chemistry laboratories at the Dikwa School of Agriculture 
into bomb-making factories when they seized the town.50 
The Nigerian Army has released a series of photos showing 
its engineers removing IEDs planted along the Gwoza-
Yamteke highway.51 The limited amount of photographs 
published of the devices used by Boko Haram indicate that 
they are IEDs, not factory produced landmines.
Military authorities stated to an Egyptian newspaper 
that they had begun to lay landmines around military 
outposts in the Sinai in May 2015.52  By October 2015, 
Egypt did not respond to a letter sent by the ICBL in June 
requesting clarification on the report. 
In the reporting period, there were reports of NSAG 
use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, 
Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
Global stockpiles of antipersonnel 
mines
The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states 
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. In 
the past, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states 
not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel 
mines. However, in 2014, China informed the Monitor 
that its stockpile is “less than” five million53 and the US 
confirmed that its stockpile is three million.54 Previously, 
China was estimated to have stockpiled 110 million 
antipersonnel mines, and the US 10.4 million. Therefore, 
the global total held by states not party may now be less 
than 50 million. (See Status and Operation of the Mine 
Ban Treaty, further below, for details on stockpiles remaining 
to be destroyed by States Parties.) 
49 “Boko Haram Landmines Kill 2 Soldiers As Army Liberate Borno Town,” 
9jainformant.net, 21 August 2015, www.9jainformant.net/2015/08/21/
boko-haram-landmines-kill-2-soldiers-as-army-liberate-borno-town/.
50 “Nigerian Army Disables Boko Haram Explosives,” Voice of America, 
5 August 2015, www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-army-dis-
ables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html.
51 “Bombs, IEDS & Land Mines: Nigeria Army Clear Gwoza -Yamteke 
Road in Borno (Photos),” Tori.ng, 5 August 2015, www.tori.ng/
news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.
html.
52 “New security plans to ‘entrap’ Sinai militants by landmines,” The 
Cairo Post, 20 May 2015, thecairopost.youm7.com/news/151695/news/
new-security-plans-to-entrap-sinai-militants-by-landmines. 
53 There is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to 
derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel 
mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatter-
able” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which 
can hold numerous individual mines.
54 For China: ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Deputy Director, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Col. Wu Gang, Policy Division, Ministry 
of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. For the US: US Department of 
Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in 
the Pentagon Briefing Room,” 27 June 2014, www.defense.gov/Tran-
scripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455.
Largest stocks of antipersonnel mines
Russia 26.5 million
Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total 45 million
States not party that may stockpile 
antipersonnel mines
Armenia Korea, North Russia
Azerbaijan Korea, South Saudi Arabia
Bahrain Kyrgyzstan Singapore








It is not clear if all 31 states currently stockpile 
antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab 
Emerates (UAE) have provided contradictory information 
regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and 
Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles, 
used solely for training purposes. Three states not party, 
all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile 
antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and 
Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine possesses stockpiles of 
antipersonnel mines.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely 
destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element 
of ammunition management programs and the phasing 
out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, stockpile 
destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.
Non-state armed groups
During this reporting period, the Polisario Front in 
Western Sahara reported the destruction of 3,000 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines, as required by its 
signature of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for 
adherence to a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines and for 
Cooperation in Mine Action.55
Fewer NSAGs today have access to factory-made 
antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due 
to the halt in trade and production and due to the 
destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. 
55 Geneva Call, “Western Sahara: the Polisario Front destroys stock-
piles of anti-personnel mines,” 31 March 2015, www.genevacall.org/
polisario-front-destroys-stockpiles-anti-personnel-mines/. Also email 
from Geneva Call in response to request for information from Carolin 
Nehme, Thematic Legal Advisor, Geneva Call, 18 June 2015.
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Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks from former 
regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria) 
or removed them from minefields, but most appear to 
make their own improvised mines from locally available 
materials. In states not party, NSAGs have also been 
known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from 
arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.
During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal 
groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to 
possess stocks of antipersonnel mines. The Monitor 
largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces 
or verified photographic evidence from journalists to 
identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.
Production and transfer of 
antipersonnel mines
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at 
some point in the past.56 A total of 40 of which have 
ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including 
four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, 
Israel, Nepal, and most recently, the US.57 A majority of 
major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among 
those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of 
antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to 
be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do 
so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel 
mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. 
Between June 2014 and June 2015, Pakistan’s armed 
forces state that they recovered 253 tons of explosives 
and thousands of weapons during operations against 
insurgents in the country.58 In 2015, the Colombian Army 
continued to locate and destroy landmine assembly 
facilities belonging to FARC.59
56 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in 
that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources 
as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.
57 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 
2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once pro-
duced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.
58 Khan, H. “2,763 terrorists killed, 347 army jawans embraced mar-
tyrdom,” The International News, 14 June 2015, www.thenews.com.
pk/Todays-News-13-38028-2763-terrorists-killed-347-army-jawans-
embraced-martyrdom.
59 For example, in June 2015 an Army unit located and destroyed a cache 
of 40 FARC mines in Planadas (Tolima). June 2014–June 2015 media 
tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, CCCM, emailed to the Monitor 
on 11 July 2015. 
Trade in antipersonnel mines 
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel 
mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This 
ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the 
stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never 
conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of 
antipersonnel mines.
While the Monitor has reported for the past decade 
that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted 
of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, 
the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan, Ukraine, and 
Yemen in recent years raises the specter that some form 
of market for antipersonnel mines exists.60
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
including six landmine producers, have enacted formal 
moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, 
India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have 
made statements declaring that they now have stopped 
exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also 
claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to 
the contrary.61
Universalizing the ban on antipersonnel 
mines
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 
1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer 
sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that 
essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 
162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 
30 acceded.62
The last to accede was Oman on 20 August 2014. No 
country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine 
Monitor 2014 was published.
The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include 
the Pacific state of the Marshall Islands, which is the only 
signatory yet to ratify.
The US government announced policy measures 
in June and September 2014 to ban future production 
and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerate 
stockpile destruction, and ban their use, except on 
60 In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel 
mines suggests that a new supply channel is in place as Yemen did 
not declare the type as part of its stockpile or as part of existing mine 
contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present 
in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden. In Sudan, the appearance in the 
past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines 
with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles 
of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in 
the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.
61 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining 
organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hun-
dreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Infor-
mation provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, 
Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. 
Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a ship-
ment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
62 The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban 
Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are 
Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 
signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 
88 ratified afterward.
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the Korean Peninsula.63 The White House said the 
new landmine policy means the US is “signaling our 
clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa 
Convention.”64
Annual UN General Assembly resolution
An annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 
provides an important opportunity for states outside 
the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the 
ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its 
universalization. A dozen of the countries that have 
acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after 
voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.65
On 2 December 2014, UNGA Resolution 69/34 
calling for universalization and full implementation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 164 states in 
favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions.66 The number 
of affirmative votes and abstentions was slightly lower 
than in 2013.67
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from 
consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea (since 
2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan 
(since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).68
Non-state armed groups
Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the 
ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength 
of the growing international norm and stigmatization of 
the weapon. At least 64 NSAGs have committed to halt 
the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.69 
The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs 
have no permanence, and frequently split into factions, 
go out of existence, or become part of state structures. 
Convention on Conventional Weapons
Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 
63 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. 
Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White House, 23 Sep-
tember 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/
fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy.
64 Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh 
Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 6/27/2014,” The White House, 
27 June 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/
press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-joint-base-an-
drews-62.
65 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, 
and Turkey.
66 The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, 
Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 
67 The resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor 
in 2013 and 2010, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138 
in 2001.
68 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban 
Treaty in 1997.
69 As of October 2014, 44 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commit-
ment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two 
signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, 
Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/
how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 2000, several declara-
tions were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom 
later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, 
and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive 
devices. The weaknesses of the original protocol and 
inadequate measures to improve it through Amended 
Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that 
resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2015, a 
total of 102 states were party to Amended Protocol II. 
One state ratified the protocol since the publication of 
Landmine Monitor 2014; Grenada on 10 December 2014.
Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol 
II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, 
India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, 
the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the 
rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine 
Ban Treaty.
The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and 
other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, 
while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol 
II, there are still 11 states that are party to the original 
protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol, 
including Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan 
and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Togo, and Uganda. 
A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines 
are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended 
Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are 
also landmine producers.
States that stockpile antipersonnel mines 










Note: Italics indicate states that also reserve the right to produce 
antipersonnel mines
Status and Operation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and 
compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. 
The core obligations have largely been respected, and 
when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt 
with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious 
compliance concerns regarding a small number of States 
Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and 
missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, 
some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to 
implement key provisions of the treaty, including those 
concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.
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Compliance
At the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States 
Parties to the convention created a new Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern 
about compliance with the convention’s prohibitions 
contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, 
to consider any follow-up that might be appropriate for 
States Parties.70
The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance delivered a three-page report to 
the June 2015 intersessional meetings detailing its work 
and preliminary observations concerning allegations or 
reports of landmine use in States Parties.71 According to 
the report, between September 2014 and May 2015 the 
Committee met several times to consider past instances 
of alleged use of antipersonnel mines and assess the 
credibility of these allegations and the value of follow-up 
on them. In that period it met with the representatives 
of concerned States Parties Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey, 
and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue 
regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines. 
The Committee did not recommend specific actions 
be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to 
further follow-up on these and other allegations of use. 
Following the presentation of the report, Ukraine and 
Turkey addressed the allegations and Austria, Norway, 
Switzerland, UNMAS, the ICRC, and the ICBL welcomed 
the Committee’s work and the report’s observations. 
Austria condemned any use of antipersonnel mines 
by any actor and called on all States Parties concerned 
to clarify outstanding allegations of use at the earliest 
possible opportunity, take any necessary steps for full 
compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, and immediately 
take all measures necessary to protect the civilian 
population from any more harm.72
Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties 
In this reporting period, commencing in October 2014, 
there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines 
by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine 
Monitor 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of 
use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State 
Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. That 
70 The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with 
the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it 
assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that 
the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention 
remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible, 
present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need 
be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States 
Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable, 
including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meet-
ings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the 
Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, 
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Deci-
sions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf. 
71 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance, “Activity 
Report and Preliminary Observations,” June 2015, www.apmineban-
convention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Co-
operative-compliance-activity-report.pdf.
72 Statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 
26 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_-_
Austria.pdf. 
is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen 
that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred 
in 2011. 
Additionally, a number of allegations of mine use in 
previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 
2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Turkey (from 2009), and 
Cambodia/Thailand (2008 and 2009) warrant resolution 
by those governments and other States Parties.
Stockpile destruction
A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile 
antipersonnel mines, of which 90 have officially declared 
completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared 
never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some 
cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has not made 
an official declaration, but is not thought to possess 
antipersonnel mines.73
Finland completed the destruction of its stockpile of 
one million mines on 18 August 2015 and was the only 
state to conclude destruction in the reporting period.74
Six States Parties stockpile antipersonnel landmines, 
including three that failed to complete the destruction of 
their stockpiles by their four-year deadline:
•	 Oman declared a stockpile of 17,260 antipersonnel 
mines of Belgian, British, and German manufacture 
in its initial Article 7 transparency report provided 
in August 2015.75 It has committed to destroy the 
stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
•	 Poland signed a contract in March 2015 to destroy 
its remaining stockpile of 16,597 landmines 
in coordination with the NATO Support and 
Procurement Agency by June 2016.76 Poland’s 
stockpile destruction deadline is 1 June 2017.
•	 Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the 
hands of former militias and private individuals,” 
and that it is “putting forth efforts to verify if in 
fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.”77 
Somalia has not reported the destruction of any 
stockpiled mines since the convention came 
into force for it. Somalia's stockpile destruction 
deadline is 1 October 2016.
•	 Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation 
of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruc-
tion of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.78
73 Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of 
antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005 
deadline had passed.
74 Juho Korpela, “The last anti-personnel mines destroyed,” Finnish 
Defense Force, 18 August 2015, bit.ly/LM15Banf74.
75 Oman listed a stockpile of 1,556 No. 7 (UK); 12,560 PRB M409 
(Belgium); and 3,144 DM31 (German) antipersonnel mines. Mine 
Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, August 2015 (in Arabic, translation by 
the Monitor), www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
957868F552AB98BAC1257E9E0054ABAC/$file/Oman+Initial+2015.pdf.
76 Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 
Geneva, June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2f_STOCKPILE_DESTRUCTION_-_Poland.
pdf.
77 Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 
2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/0421E458A87D2CA5C1257B-
4A004C41CE/$file/Somalia+2012.pdf. 
78 Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had 
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Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 
49 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including 
more than 530,000 destroyed in 2014. 
Five States Parties collectively possess more than 
nine million antipersonnel mines remaining to be 
destroyed: Ukraine (5,767,600), Belarus (2,861,636), 
Greece (452,695), Oman (17,260), and Poland (16,957). 
The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to 
complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep 
concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The 
Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties 
that missed their deadline to comply without delay and 
also to communicate their plans to do so, to request 
any assistance needed, and to provide an expected 
completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call 
for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of 
their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
•	 At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, Belarus 
reported that all of its stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines other than those considered to be in 
an “unsafe condition” will be destroyed by 1 
November 2016.79
•	 In a statement released 31 December 2014, Greece 
stated that “it was reviewing all possible options 
in an effort to adhere to its initial intention to 
complete the destruction of all stockpiled anti-
personnel mines by the end of 2015.”80
•	 At the June 2015 intersessional meetings, Ukraine 
stated that PFM mines are ready to be destroyed at 
the incinerator located at the Pavlograd Chemical 
Plant but budgetary priority has been focused on 
national defense. Ukraine expressed its willingness 
for further negotiations for international funding 
for the destruction of its remaining stockpile.81 
It destroyed 576 PFM mines in 2014, which had 
become unstable in storage and dangerous.82
Mines retained for training and research 
(Article 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to 
retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for 
the development of and training in mine detection, mine 
clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount 
of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number 
absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.” 
A total of 72 States Parties have reported that they 
retain antipersonnel mines for training and research 
purposes, of which 38 have retained more than 1,000 
mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey) 
a deadline of 1 June 2010.
79 Preliminary Observations of the President of the Fourteenth Meeting of 
the States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 
23 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2015-Stockpile-Destruction-2f-corrected.pdf.
80 Ibid.
81 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on 
Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, www.apminebancon-
vention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/2e_COOPERATIVE_
COMPLIANCE_COMMITTEE_Ukraine.pdf.
82 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2015, www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6EFB9D23D790FA91C1257E-
62005235CE/$file/Ukraine+2014.pdf.
have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-five 
States Parties have declared that they do not retain any 
antipersonnel mines, including 33 states that stockpiled 
antipersonnel mines in the past.83 A total of 43% of 
the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an 
annual transparency report for calendar year 2014, which 
was due by 30 April 2015. 
Due to this lack of information, it is not possible to 
present a total figure of mines retained for 2014 that 
would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for 
previous years.
In addition to those listed above, an additional 33 
States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and 
together possess a total of 14,288 retained mines.84
Key updates from calendar year 2014 were:
•	 Oman submitted its initial Article 7 report, 
retaining 2,000 mines.
•	 Australia only retains mines without detonators, 
which are not defined as antipersonnel mines, 
meaning it no longer retains mines.
•	 The number of retained mines in Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom (UK) increased.
The ICBL has expressed concern regarding the 
large number of States Parties that are retaining mines 
but apparently not using those mines for permitted 
purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines 
retained remains the same each year, indicating none are 
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research 
activities. No other details have been provided about how 
the mines are being used. Eight States Parties have never 
reported consuming any mines retained for permitted 
purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: 
Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Togo. 
Numerous States Parties have reported decreases 
in the number of mines retained, but only a few have 
explained the reductions in their transparency reports. 
Among the states that reduced the number of mines 
retained without explanation for calendar year 2014 were 
Brazil (2,037 fewer), Greece (345), Cambodia (80), Czech 
Republic (37), Slovakia (35), Spain (31), Belarus (24), and 
Thailand (19).
Three States Parties increased the number of their 
retained mines in the reporting period. The United 
Kingdom retained an additional 353 mines, Ireland 
increased by 59, and Denmark increased by 12.
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties 
are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices 
that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
83 No Article 7 reports for four of the remaining five States Parties could 
be found: Central African Republic, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The fifth, Tuvalu, has yet to 
submit their initial Article 7 report.
84 States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Angola 
(972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Jordan (850), 
Argentina (841), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom 
(724), Portugal (694), Italy (624), South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), 
Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Nicaragua (448), Togo (436), Slo-
venia (361), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Lithuania 
(269), Uruguay (260), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), 
Fiji (93), Rwanda (65), Ireland (59), Senegal (50), Benin (16), Guin-
ea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).
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otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning 
as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction 
of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered 
antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:
•	 Afghanistan keeps no live landmines for its entire 
stock of 2,360 retained mines.
•	 Australia keeps no serviceable detonators for its 
entire stock of 459 retained mines.
•	 Canada reported it has transferred 84 mines from 
Afghanistan without fuzes.
•	 Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains a stockpile of 
983 fuzeless mines.
















Finland 16,500 (2014) 16,500 0 None ever —
Turkey 14,902 (2014) 16,000 42 2014 —
Bangladesh 12,050 (2013) 15,000 450 2013 —
Sweden 6,183 (2014) 13,948 52 2014 —
Belarus 5,998 (2014) 7,530 24 2014 —
Algeria 5,970 (2014) 15,030 0 2009 —
Greece 5,797 (2014) 7,224 345 2014 —
Croatia 5,685 (2014) 17,500 29 2014 —
Venezuela 4,874 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 —
Tunisia 4,670 (2014) 5,000 100 2014 —
France 3,956 (2014) 4,539 2 2014 —
Yemen 3,760 (2013) 4,000 0 2008 —
Bulgaria 3,669 (2014) 10,466 3 2014 6,446
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever —
Brazil 3,214 (2014) 17,000 2,037 2014 —
Thailand 3,208 (2014) 15,604 19 2014 4,517
Serbia 3,149 (2014) 5,000 0 2011 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R None ever —
Chile 2,824 (2014) 28,647 101 2014 23,694
Cambodia 2,747 (2014) 701 80 2014 —
Belgium 2,564 (2014) 5,980 0 2013 —
Indonesia 2,454 (2013) 4,978 0 2009 2,524
Romania 2,395 (2013) 4,000 0 2013 1,500
Czech Rep. 2,264 (2014) 4,859 37 2014 —
Peru 2,015 (2014) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Sudan 1,938 (2015) 10,000 N/R 2008 —
Oman 2,000 (2015) 2,000 N/R None ever —
Canada 1,909 (2014) 1,781 0 2013 —
Denmark 1,832 (2014) 4,991 0 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 —
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 —
Japan 1,663 (2014) 15,000 267 2014 —
Spain 1,660 (2013) 10,000 31 2014 6,000
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 —
Netherlands 1,557 (2013) 4,076 0 2013 —
Slovakia 1,185 (2014) 7,000 35 2014 5,500
Germany 1,143 (2014) 3,006 737 2014 —
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 —
Botswana 1,019 (2011) 1,019 N/R Unclear —
Partial Total 149,312 325,770 4,391 69,571
Note: N/R = not reported.
States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines
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•	 Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless.
•	 Lithuania reported it has 269 mines with 
command-controlled fuzes, which are not covered 
under the treaty.
•	 Eritrea, France, Germany, Mozambique, and 
Senegal also reported that some of the mines they 
retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise 
incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.
A total of 25 States Parties have over time used expanded 
Form D of their annual transparency reports to voluntarily 
report additional information on retained mines.85
Transparency reporting
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State 
Party “report to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later 
than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement 
the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report 
annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.
During the reporting period, October 2014 to October 
2015, an initial report was submitted by Oman in August 
2015. Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012) has never submitted 
an initial report. As of 27 October 2015, only 41% of 
States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar 
year 2014. 
Of the 94 States Parties86 that have failed to meet 
their most recent annual reporting obligation, 74 have 
failed to submit an annual transparency report for two 
or more years. Among the States Parties that did not 
submit reports for 2014 are five States Parties with Article 
5 clearance obligations (Ethiopia, Niger, Palau, Somalia, 
and Yemen). 
No state submitted a voluntary report in 2015. In 
previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), 
Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia 
(2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary 
reports. 
85 Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Romania, Tajik-
istan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Zambia. Some States 
Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D.
86 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cam-
eroun, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook 
Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethi-
opia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mad-
agascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, 
Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, 
São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor-
Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
Mine Action
P
rogress continues to be made in removing the 
threat of antipersonnel mines. The amount of 
land reported to be cleared of landmines glob-
ally in 2014 increased to 201km2, compared 
to 185km2 in 2013. Twenty-eight States Parties 
have completed clearance since 1999. However, 
progress is slow. As few as three of the 33 
States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations are on 
track to meet their deadlines, even though in many cases 
this should be achievable. Improvements are needed in 
defining the size of the remaining antipersonnel mine con-
tamination, reporting on survey and clearance results, and 
the timeliness and quality of extension requests.
Status and Key Developments 
2014–20151  
•	 Sixty-one states and areas have an identified threat 
of antipersonnel mine contamination: 33 States 
Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas. A 
further five States Parties have either suspected or 
residual mine contamination.
•	 In its initial Article 7 transparency report, 
Oman declared for the first time that it has 
areas suspected of being contaminated with 
antipersonnel mines, and therefore has been 
added to the list of contaminated States Parties. 
New antipersonnel mine contamination arising in 
Ukraine has resulted in it being added to the list of 
contaminated States Parties. 
•	 A total of 201km2 was reported to be cleared of 
landmines in 2014, an increase from an estimated 
185km2 in 2013. The total number of antipersonnel 
mines reported to be destroyed was 232,000, a 
decrease from 275,000 in 2013. Last year, the ICBL 
1 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of Norwegian People’s 
Aid (NPA), which conducted the majority of mine action research per-
formed in 2015 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is respon-
sible for the findings presented here.
•	 stated that it believed that more than 200km2 of 
mined area could be cleared annually, and in 2014 
this was achieved.2
•	 Twenty-eight States Parties have completed 
implementation of Article 5 since 1999.3 Burundi 
announced in April 2014 that it had completed 
survey and clearance of its remaining suspected 
mined areas and reiterated this announcement 
in June 2014. In September 2015, Mozambique 
declared itself clear of antipersonnel mines.4
•	 Twenty-seven States Parties have requested and 
received extended deadlines for clearance. In 2014, 
four States Parties submitted extension requests, 
all of which were approved at the third review 
conference: the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DR Congo), Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. In 
2015, four states submitted extension requests 
for consideration by the 14th Meeting of States 
Parties, 30 November to 4 December 2015: Cyprus, 
Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Senegal. 
•	 Only three States Parties appear to be on track to 
meet their Article 5 clearance deadline.
2 Landmine Monitor 2014, Mine Action chapter, p. 21.
3 In addition, El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine 
Ban Treaty was created. Jordan declared completion of clearance in 
April 2012 but has found hundreds of antipersonnel mines during sub-
sequent verification and clearance operations; it therefore still has an 
obligation under Article 5.
4 In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Old-
emiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines. 
UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated, 
www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environ-
mentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/. 
An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that fol-
lowing its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine 
clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was 
expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban 
Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Com-
mittee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015. Burundi 
had declared completion in November 2011 but subsequently discov-
ered additional areas requiring clearance, and cleared those prior to its 
deadline. Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Con-
ference, 26 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/
APMBC-RC3/thursday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf. 
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Mine Contamination in 2014
It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the 
total area contaminated by landmines due to a lack of 
data. Estimates of the size of contaminated areas have 
tended to be exaggerated as a result of poor surveys. 
However, global understanding of the scale of the 
problem is gradually improving each year, particularly 
among States Parties, as they make increased use of land 
release methodologies to cancel suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) by non-technical survey, and reduce 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) through technical 
survey. No estimate of the size of contamination exists 
for seven States Parties, 18 states not party, and one 
other area, which are known to be contaminated (for 
further details of the estimated extent of antipersonnel 
mine contamination, please see the Mine Action country 
profiles at www.the-monitor.org).
Prior to 2014, Ukraine did not report any mine 
contamination under Article 5, as the scope of any 
residual mine problem it had was not known. In 2014, new 
contamination was reported in Ukraine and in a number 
of other states that were already contaminated (for details 
please see the Ban Policy chapter of this publication).
Five States Parties have residual or 
suspected contamination: Djibouti,5 Moldova,6 
5 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and 
France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in 
Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be 
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border con-
flict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made 
a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
6 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a state-
ment in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal respon-
sibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of 
Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, 
this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_june08/
Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2June08-Moldova-en.pdf.
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics. 
*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas. 
**Cyprus states that no minefields remain under Cypriot control. 
***The known area in Georgia is small, but there may be mined areas in South Ossetia. 
****The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era 
boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories. 
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Namibia,7 Palau,8 and the Philippines.9 These States 
Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to 
identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control 
that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any 
that they find. In cases where they are unable to complete 
this work within their Article 5 deadline, they must 
request an extension in order to remain in compliance 
with the treaty.
Mine Clearance in 2014
Total global clearance of landmines in 2014 was 
estimated to be 201km2, with 232,000 antipersonnel 
mines and 11,500 antivehicle mines destroyed. This 
represents an increase from 185km2 of total area cleared 
in 2013, although a decrease from the destruction of 
approximately 275,000 antipersonnel mines.
7 Despite a statement by Namibia given at the Second Review Confer-
ence that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to 
whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example 
in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
8 Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the 
first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its ter-
ritory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contami-
nation in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge). In May 
2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working 
in Palau to clear unexploded ordnance, including land and sea mines, 
but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies 
due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowl-
edge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”
9 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-
state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the 
presence of mined areas.
Ten countries comprised three-quarters of all 
reported clearance efforts in 2014. However, in three of 
these countries, there were substantial inconsistencies 
between data sources in reported areas cleared. Many 
states do not report on clearance, therefore this total 
figure is intentionally conservative and understates the 
extent of clearance.
Five of the 10 most contaminated States Parties do 
not appear in the table above. Four of these states—
BiH, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe—had low rates of 
clearance in 2014, ranging from 0.15km2 to 1.85km2, while 
Chad did not report on the amount of land cleared. 
No clearance figures were reported in 2014 for the 
following States Parties: Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal, 
and Ukraine. Clearance was not reported in the following 
states not party: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao 
PDR, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 








Afghanistan 62.87 12,517 Major discrepancies between 
the Article 7 report and data-
from the mine action center
Cambodia 54.38 20,479 Substantial inconsistencies 
in data, and discrepancies 
between the Article 7 report 




Iraq 5.58 16,734 Major discrepancies between 
data provided by mine action 
centers and operators
Azerbaijan 4.76 42
Sri Lanka 3.75 32,223
Mozambique 3.07 45,681 
South Sudan 2.62 880
Angola 2.6 2,676
Sub-totals 183.78 175,502
Other programs combined 17.19 56,307
Total global clearance 200.97 231,809
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.








2014 201 231,708 11,500
2013 185 275,000 4,500
2012 200 240,000 9,300
2011 190 325,000 29,900
2010 200 388,000 27,000
Total 976 1,479,708 82,200
Mine clearance in 2010–2014 (km2)
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South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Egypt 
and Morocco reported very high clearance figures, but 
provided no further details, therefore those figures have 
not been included in the total global clearance figure. 
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 
Obligations
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties 
are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as 
possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party 
to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves 
unable to complete their mine clearance obligations 
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline 
extension of up to 10 years.
Completion of Article 5 implementation
Twenty-eight States Parties, one state not party, and one 
other area have completed clearance since the treaty 
entered into force in 1999. Burundi, which had reported 
additional suspected mined areas after declaring 
completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2011, announced 
that its subsequent survey and clearance efforts in 2014 
had been completed.10 Mozambique declared completion 
of its Article 5 obligations in September 2015.11 However, 
because Mozambique had not requested an additional 
extension to its deadline of 1 January 2015, for eight 
months Mozambique was in violation of the Mine Ban 
Treaty. Montenegro has still formally to report completion 
of its Article 5 obligations.
State Parties that have completed Article 5 
implementation since 1999
In addition, state not party Nepal and other area 
Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas 
since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance 
in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created. 
10 Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 26 
June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/
thursday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_Burundi.pdf
11 In a public ceremony, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Old-
emiro Baloi declared the country to be free of the “threat” of mines. 
UNDP in Mozambique, “Mozambique declared ‘mine free,’” undated, 
www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/ourwork/environ-
mentandenergy/successstories/Mozambique_Declared_Mine_free/. 
An email from Hans Risser, UNDP, 13 October 2015 stated that 
following its announcement of completing the last antipersonnel mine 
clearance task on its territory in September 2015, Mozambique was 
expected to make a formal declaration of compliance with its Mine Ban 
Treaty Article 5 obligations and submit a report to the Article 5 Com-
mittee at the next Meeting of States Parties in December 2015.
Progress on meeting deadlines 
As of November 2015, only three States Parties are on 
track to meet their clearance deadlines, while 20 are not 
on track, and the status of three is unclear. Four States 
Parties are awaiting approval of their extension requests 
submitted in 2015. Two States Parties have missed their 
deadlines.
The assessments of the status of each States Party 
regarding the fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations are 
made through consideration of several factors including 
the deadline date, the remaining challenge and the 
extent to which it is known, clearance rates, mine action 
capacity and assets, funding prospects, and the existence 
of any conflict and insecurity problems.12
Four States Parties submitted extension requests that 
were approved at the Third Review Conference in June 
2014:13
•	 DR Congo requested a six-year extension period to 
conduct non-technical and technical surveys and 
clearance in order to complete its obligations.14 In 
granting DR Congo’s second extension request, 
States Parties called on DR Congo to present a 
detailed workplan by 30 April 2015. However, in 
June 2015 DR Congo informed States Parties that 
due to funding difficulties it was unable to submit 
a workplan until the next meeting of States Parties 
in December 2015.15
•	 Eritrea’s extension request sought a further five 
years to continue clearance and complete resurvey 
of SHAs, but not to fulfil its clearance obligations 
under the treaty. In granting the extension request, 
States Parties noted that five additional years 
beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline 
“appeared to be a long period of time to meet this 
objective.”16
•	 Yemen’s second extension request acknowledged 
that it was largely “based on speculation,”17 and 
operations in 2014 in fact fell well short of the 
extension request target of clearing 1.6km2 a year, 
hampered by insecurity and by an acute shortage 
of funds.
•	 Zimbabwe’s three-year extension request was 
to enable further survey and clearance, but not 
to complete its clearance obligations within 
the requested period. Zimbabwe undertook “to 
12 The status assessments were made by NPA, and the Monitor concurs 
with these conclusions. 
13 APLC/CONF/2014/CRP.1, Final Draft Document, Mine Ban Treaty 
Third Review Conference, 27 June 2014, pp. 6–10, www.maputoreview-
conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.
14 Analysis of DR Congo’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, sub-
mitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Confer-
ence on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for 
extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 5.
15 Statement of DR Congo, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 
Standing Committee on Article 5 Implementation Matters, Geneva, 25 
June 2015.
16 Decision on the Eritrea Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 
by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 
Maputo, 26 June 2014.
17 Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 
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States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of any 
deadline extensions
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years 1 March 2023 Not on track
Algeria 1 April 2012 5 years 1 April 2017 On track
Angola 1 January 2013 5 years 1 January 2018 Not on track
Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years 1 March 2020 No change since extension 
requested 
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Cambodia 1 January 2010 10 years 1 January 2020 Not on track
Chad 1 November 2009 14 months (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)
1 January 2020 Not on track
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years 1 March 2020 On track
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years 1 March 2021 Not on track
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track 




1 July 2016 Extension requested to 1 July 
2019
DR Congo 1 November 2012 26 months (1st extn.)
6 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 On track
Ecuador 1 October 2009 8 years 1 October 2017 Not on track
Eritrea 1 February 2012 3 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 February 2020 Not on track
Ethiopia 1 June 2015 5 year request sub-
mitted in 2015 after 
missing deadline
In violation of Mine Ban 
Treaty. Extension requested to 
31 May 2020
Iraq 1 February 2018 N/A Not on track
Jordan 1 May 2009 3 years 1 May 2012 Should submit extension 
request*
Mauritania 1 January 2011 5 years
Second extension 
request for five years 
submitted in 2015
1 January 2016 Extension requested to 1 
January 2021
Niger 1 September 2009 N/A** 31 December 2015 Not on track. Intends to 
submit a second extension 
request in 2015
Oman 1 February 2025 No assessment at this point
Peru 1 March 2009 8 years 1 March 2017 Not on track 
Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years
Second extension  
request for five years 
submitted in 2015
1 March 2016 Extension requested to 1 
March 2021
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years 1 March 2019 Unclear
Somalia 1 October 2022 N/A Not on track
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A Not on track
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years 1 April 2019 Not on track
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years 1 April 2020 Unclear
Thailand 1 May 2009 9.5 years 1 November 2018 Not on track
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years 1 March 2022 Not on track 
Ukraine 1 June 2016 N/A Unclear
United Kingdom 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
22 /  Landmine monitor 2015
Mine Action
clarify the remaining challenge, understand what 
progress will be possible once partners operate 
at full capacity and once additional support has 
been identified, produce a detailed plan, and 
submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its 
Article 5 obligations.”18 In granting the request, 
States Parties stated that Zimbabwe had not 
complied with the principal commitment it made 
under previous extension requests “to garner an 
understanding of the true remaining extent of 
the challenge and to develop plans.” They noted 
the progress made toward building capacity and 
increasing efficiency by engaging support from 
international organizations.19
Four States Parties submitted extension requests in 
2015 for approval at the 14th meeting of States Parties, to 
be held 30 November–4 December 2015:
•	 Cyprus submitted a second request on 27 March 
2015, for a further three-year extension, until 1 July 
2019. The reason cited for the second extension 
request was the same as the first request, namely 
that Cyprus does not have effective control over 
remaining contaminated areas.20
•	 Ethiopia is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty 
for missing its 1 June 2015 clearance deadline, 
a situation that could have been avoided by 
accelerating progress in previous years or by 
requesting an extended deadline in 2014, as per 
the process agreed at the Seventh Meeting of 
States Parties. Ethiopia submitted a request on 
15 June 2015 for an extension of five years until 1 
June 2020 to complete survey and clearance of 
all remaining mined areas.21 Ethiopia’s extension 
request contains a number of inconsistences and 
errors. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation 
therefore asked for clarification of several points, 
and a response was provided on 26 October 2015. 
•	 Mauritania submitted an extension request in 
April 2015 because of suspected contamination 
on the border with the area of Western Sahara, in 
locations where border demarcation needs to be 
18 Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine 
Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014. 
19 Ibid.
20 Second Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 
March 2015.
21 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 
10.
clarified. In its request for a second extension, up 
to 1 January 2021, the Mauritanian government 
said it would enter into a dialogue with “all of the 
stakeholders in the Western Sahara conflict so 
as to be in a position to clarify the status of the 
suspected areas.”22
•	 Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension 
request submitted in June 2015 included plans for 
survey and clearance in 2016–2020, but did not 
specify how developments in peace discussions 
were expected to impact clearance, how the armed 
forces would be involved in the clearance process, 
or how resources would be mobilized.23
Niger announced in June 2015 that it would submit a 
second extension request which, as of 8 November 2015, 
has yet to be submitted.
Funding shortages have been cited as an impediment 
to fulfilling Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations by 
or for approximately one-third of States Parties with 
outstanding obligations. Several of these states are also 
experiencing conflict or security problems that contribute 
to the lack of donor support. Conflict and security 
problems are reported to severely affect implementation 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and 
Yemen. In the following countries, insecurity is reported 
to hamper land release efforts in specific geographical 
areas: Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan, 
Thailand, and Turkey. 
However, many of the States Parties that have 
requested extensions, or are not on track to meet their 
deadlines, are not facing such constraints. The Cartagena 
Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference 
in 2009 stated that extensions should only be needed 
“due to exceptional circumstances.”24 Despite this, by 
November 2015, of the 33 States Parties with outstanding 
clearance obligations, 28 have requested deadline 
extensions, eight of which have requested extensions 
at least twice. The ICBL has called on States Parties 
to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance 
obligations.25
22 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 
2015, p. 4.
23 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 28.
24 “Cartagena Action Plan 200-2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by 
Anti-Personnel Mines,” 11 December 2009, p. 4, www.cartagena-
summit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFI-
CIAL-11Dec2009.pdf.
25 See for example ICBL, Statement on Clearance, Third Review Confer-
ence of the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 June 2014, icbl.org/media/1466485/
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st extn.)
5 years  (2nd extn.)
1 March 2020 Not on track
Zimbabwe 1 March 2009 22 months (1st extn.)
2 years (2nd extn.)
2 years (3rd extn.)
3 years (4th extn.)
1 January 2018 Not on track
 *Jordan formally declared completion of clearance at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in 2012. However, given Jordan’s recognition that 
it still has suspected hazardous areas, it has outstanding Article 5 obligations to fulfil, and should submit an extension request. 
** Niger’s first extension request was granted in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline. 
N/A = not applicable.
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Many of those States Parties with extended deadlines 
in place are making only limited progress, as the table 
above indicates. Moreover, many have not provided 
clear plans on how they intend to meet their clearance 
obligations within their deadlines. The Committee on 
Article 5 Implementation observed that of the “States 
Parties that are in the process of implementing Article 
5, few have reported that they have a plan to complete 
implementation of Article 5, some have plans that extend 
beyond their deadlines and many have not indicated that 
they have plans leading up to their deadlines.”26
Monitoring the progress of States Parties 
against their Article 5 obligations and the 
Maputo Action Plan
The Maputo Action Plan was adopted at the Third Review 
Conference on 27 June 2014. Actions 8, 9, and 11 relate 
to clearance, and States Parties agreed to “commit to 
intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-
bound obligations with the urgency that the completion 
work requires.”27
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation was 
established by the Third Review Conference, replacing 
the Standing Committee on Mine Action.28 Its purpose 
is to “intensify efforts, particularly those outlined in 
the Maputo Action Plan, to ensure that Article 5 is fully 
implemented as soon as possible, while acknowledging 
local, national and regional circumstances in its practical 
implementation.” It also analyzes each request for an 
Article 5 extended deadline. It presented its preliminary 
observations on Article 5 implementation on 23 June 
2015, reporting on 16 of the 18 States Parties that had 
submitted information by that date.29
With regard to Maputo Action Plan Action 
#8 (quantification and qualification of remaining 
contamination challenge), the Committee assessed the 
degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding 
that only four of the 16 States Parties had provided a 
high degree of clarity: Afghanistan, Ecuador, Sudan, and 
Thailand. 
In assessing Maputo Action Plan Action #9 
(application of land release methodologies), the 
Committee called on States Parties to align their national 
mine action standards with the revised International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) if they have not already 
done so.
Maputo Action Plan Action #11 calls for on-time 
submission of high-quality requests. In 2015, two states 
submitted on-time requests (Cyprus and Mauritania), 
icbl-3rc-statement-on-clearance.pdf. 
26 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implemen-
tation, 23 June 2015, p. 4, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
APMBC/IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.
pdf. 
27 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/
fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.
pdf.
28 Draft Final Document, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.
org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.
29 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementa-
tion, 23 June 2015, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/
IWP/IM-June15/IM-June2014-Preliminary_observations-Art5.pdf.
while Ethiopia and Senegal missed the submission 
deadline by more than 15 months and 2.5 months 
respectively. One state announced its intention to 
submit a request that has still not been made public as 
of 8 November 2015 (Niger). The requests prepared by 
Ethiopia and Senegal lacked the consistency, accuracy, 
and comprehensiveness that would characterize high-
quality requests.
As of 1 November 2015, Article 7 transparency reports 
for 2014 were still outstanding for eight states with 
contamination: Angola, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Yemen. Maputo Action 
Plan Action #25 calls for the annual submission of high-
quality and updated information.
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Casualties
L
andmines, victim-activated improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants,1 and 
other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—hence-
forth mines/ERW—remain a significant indis-
criminate threat. 
For 2014, the Monitor recorded 3,678 mine/
ERW casualties marking a 12% increase from 
2013. The percentage of civilian casualties, as compared 
to military and security forces,2 was 80% in 2014 (where 
the civil status was known), almost identical to 2013.3
Despite ongoing casualties and the significant 
increase compared to 2013, 2014 still had the second 
lowest annual total of mine/ERW casualties recorded 
since 1999. There has been an overall trend of 
progressively fewer casualties since the Mine Ban Treaty 
entered into force 1999.
There were an average of 10 casualties per day in 2014, 
whereas in 1999 there was more than one mine/ERW 
casualty occurring each hour on average.4 Yet the total 
global number of casualties continues to grow each year. 
Over 96,000 mine/ERW casualties have been recorded 
by the Monitor since its global tracking in began in 1999.
1 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor 
global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster 
munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported 
in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information 
on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster 
Munition Monitor 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/clus-
ter-munition-monitor-2015/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
2 Security forces include police and representatives of non-state armed 
groups.
3  The percentage of civilian casualties was 79% in 2013, 81% in 2012, 
and 70% in 2011. Since 2005, civilians have represented approxi-
mately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known. 
From 1999–2003, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% 
per year.
4 In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties. Given 
significant improvements in data collection since 1999, with a higher 
proportion of casualties now being recorded, the decrease in casual-
ties is likely even more significant.
Cumulative total of mine/ERW casualties 
recorded 1999–20145
5  Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices 
detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, 
such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explo-
sive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated 
IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collec-
tively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are also disaggre-
gated and reported as distinct from ERW where possible. Not included 
in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not 
given, incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused 
by remotely-detonated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-acti-
vated), and people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing 
devices. For more details on casualty figures or sources of casualty 
data by country or area, see country profiles on the Monitor website, 
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx.
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Albania’s victim assistance 
focal point Veri Dogjani 
(right), a qualified medical 
doctor, discusses emergency 
response with NPA medical 
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Casualties in 2014
Of the total of 3,678 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor 
recorded for 2014, at least 1,243 people were killed and 
another 2,386 people were injured; for 49 casualties it 
was not known if the person survived.6 The Monitor 
recorded 3,308 casualties in 2013. In many states and 
areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, 
the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher.
The data collected by the Monitor is the most 
comprehensive and widely used annual dataset of 
casualties caused by mines/ERW.7 Casualties were 
identified in a total of 58 states and other areas in 2014.8 
Of the total casualties in 2014, 70% (2,593) occurred 
among States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.9
In 2014, there were far more victim-activated IED 
casualties in Afghanistan (809, compared to 567 in 
2013), as well as a smaller increase in casualties caused 
by ERW (430, compared to 399 in 2013). In Mali, there 
was a jump in the number of mine casualties, thought to 
be due to antivehicle mines (92 in 2014, compared with 
31 in 2013). In addition, victim-activated IED casualties 
were recorded in Mali for the first time (16).10 In both 
Chad and Cambodia, the numbers of casualties from 
landmines, antivehicle mines, and ERW all increased 
6 This is among the lowest number of unknowns since Monitor 
recording began in 1999.
7 For the year 2014, the Monitor collected casualty data from 25 dif-
ferent national or UN mine action centers. The Monitor also collected 
data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim 
assistance service providers, as well as from a range of national and 
international media sources. Mine action centers registered 835 of the 
3,678 casualties identified in 2014. The Monitor identified 591 mine/
ERW casualties in 2014 through the media that had not been collected 
via official data-collection mechanisms. The majority of these casual-
ties occurred in countries without any data-collection mechanism.
8 The Monitor first recorded 72 states in which mine/ERW casualties 
were identified in 1999.
9 Casualties were identified in the following 37 States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty in 2014: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
10 The remainder of the increase for Mali was casualties caused by 
ERW: 33 in 2014, up from 21 in 2013. The number of casualties from 
unknown devices declined: 3 in 2014, down from 16 in 2013.
compared to 2013.11 One factor influencing the increased 
number of casualties reported in Myanmar appeared to 
have been more extensive data collection, with a larger 
number of organizations engaged and reporting on the 
landmine issue.
States with 100 or more recorded 
casualties in 2014








Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold
However, it must be stressed that, as in previous 
years, the 3,678 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2014 
only include recorded casualties. Due to incomplete data 
collection at the national level, the true casualty total is 
certainly higher. Based on the updated Monitor research 
methodology in place since 2009, it is estimated that there 
are up to approximately 1,000 additional casualties  (25–
30%) each year that are not captured in its global mine/
ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely 
affected countries and those experiencing conflict. The 
level of underreporting has declined over time as many 
countries have initiated and improved casualty data-
collection mechanisms and the sharing of this data. 
In 2014, however, the number of casualties missed in 
national annual reporting is expected to be higher than 
average with more than 1,000 casualties (1,200–1,500), 
including many casualties from recently emplaced IEDs 
and booby traps in Iraq and Syria, yet to be accurately 
recorded. Some media reports quoted sources that said 
there had been hundreds of such casualties.12
Yet the 2014 estimate is a significant drop from the 
estimated total in 1999, when the monitor identified 
some 9,000 casualties, with another 7,000–13,000 
annual casualties estimated as unrecorded.
Some significant country-level decreases in casualty 
totals in 2014 were likely due in part to conflict and 
insecurity reducing the possibility of data collection. 
In Yemen, reported casualties decreased from 55 in 
2013 to 24 in 2014, significantly reduced from a peak 
of 263 in 2012. In Syria, a state not party to the Mine 
Ban Treaty that had seen a significant increase in mine/
ERW casualties in 2013, casualty recording was reported 
11 For Chad the following casualties were reported: 46 via unspecified 
mine types in 2014, and 20 in 2013; 20 antipersonnel mine in 2014, 
and none (differentiated) in 2013; and 13 ERW in 2014, and none (dif-
ferentiated) in 2013. Cambodia reported the following casualties: 37 
via antipersonnel mine in 2014, and 25 in 2013; 35 antivehicle mine in 
2014, and 24 in 2013; 81 ERW in 2014, and 60 in 2013. The remaining 
casualties in Cambodia were from unexploded submunitions, one in 
2014, and three in 2013.
12 However, it was often not clearly reported whether devices were 
victim-activated.
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to have been seriously hindered by the deteriorating 
security situation in 2014. Syria had 174 recorded 
casualties in 2014, compared to 201 in 2013. Just 19 
casualties were recorded for Ukraine in 2014, although 
other reporting implied that there were hundreds of 
mine/ERW casualties through 2014 and into 2015, but 
the reports lacked sufficient detail to be included in the 
Monitor data set.
Fluctuations in annual casualties recorded in Angola 
(11 in 2014, 71 in 2013, and 34 in 2012) and in Iraq (64 in 
2014, 124 in 2013, and 84 in 2012) are attributable to a 
lack of a reliable collection mechanism for casualty data 
in those countries. This causes variability in casualty 
totals and makes trends difficult to discern, as noted 
in the previous Landmine Monitor report. In addition, 
while data collection within Iran is thought to be quite 
complete, it has not been made available to the Monitor 
consistently. Consequently, the casualty data was often 
compiled from various sources, as was the case for 2014.
Casualty demographics13
There were 1,038 child casualties in 2014, continuing 
minor annual decreases from 1,112 in 2013 and 1,272 in 
2012. Child casualties in 2014 accounted for 39% of all 
civilian casualties for whom the age was known.14 Since 
the Monitor began recording casualties in 1999, there 
has been an average of 31% child casualties among all 
casualties from mines/ERW.15
As in previous years, in 2014 the vast majority of child 
casualties where the sex was known were boys (81%).16 
There were 561 child casualties in Afghanistan in 2014, 
representing nearly half (46%) of all civilian casualties in 
that country where the age was known. It also constitutes 
over half (54%) of all child casualties recorded globally 
in 2014. 
For more information on child casualties and 
assistance see the annual Monitor fact sheet on 
Landmines/ERW and Children.
Mine/ERW casualties by age in 201417
13 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status 
of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and 
disaggregated.
14 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less 
than 18-years of age at the time of the incident.
15 The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999, and 
more than 1,600 in 2001.
16 The sex of 33 child casualties was not recorded.
17 This includes only the civilian casualties for which the age was known.
Mine/ERW incidents impact not only the direct 
casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who were 
killed, as well as the survivors18—but also members 
of their families struggling under new physical, 
psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous 
years, there was no substantial data available on the 
numbers of those people indirectly impacted as a result 
of mine/ERW casualties.
In 2014, the percentage of female casualties among 
all casualties for which the sex was known was 12% (378 
of 3,234). This was the same percentage as in 2012 and 
in 2013.19
Mine/ERW casualties by sex in 201420
Between 1999 and 2014, the Monitor identified more 
than 1,600 deminers who were killed or injured while 
undertaking clearance operations to ensure the safety of 
civilian populations.21 In 2014, there were 53 casualties 
identified among deminers (five deminers were killed 
and 48 injured) in 10 states,22 a significant decrease in 
the number of demining casualties in the preceding two 
years: 85 in 2013, and 132 in 2012. It was also about half 
of the average of 105 casualties among deminers per year 
since 1999.
In 2014, the highest numbers of casualties among 
deminers were in Iran (17), Afghanistan (16), and Lebanon 
(six). Together, these three countries represented almost 
75% of all deminer casualties globally in 2014. The 
17 deminer casualties in Iran continued the trend of 
declining casualties among deminers since 2012; 687 
deminer casualties have been identified in Iran since 
2006.23 Demining casualties in Afghanistan have been 
18 A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
19 For 444 casualties the sex was not known.
20 This includes only the casualties for which the sex was known.
21 There were 1,623 casualties among deminers from 1999 through 
2014. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identi-
fied has fluctuated widely, making it difficult to discern trends. Most 
major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or 
unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any 
given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes 
in operating procedures, in international demining standards, or 
demining equipment.
22 Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Iran, Lebanon, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Zimbabwe, and Somaliland.
23 No data on deminer casualties in Iran prior to 2006 was available to 
the Monitor for inclusion in this report. Even based on partial data, 
Iran exceeded all countries in the total number of demining casualties 
since 1999. Afghanistan, with the second highest number of deminer 
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moderately consistent, with 18 casualties identified in 
2013 and 16 in 2012. 
Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military 
status in 201424
Civilian casualties represented 80% of casualties 
where the civilian/military status was known (2,833 of 
3,528). 
The country with the most annual military casualties 
continued to be Colombia, with 187 in 2014. Mali, with 84 
military casualties (including peacekeeping forces), was 
the next highest. The third highest number in 2014 was in 
Pakistan, with 75 military casualties, followed by Algeria 
(54) and Syria (52).
Victim-activated weapons and other 
explosive items causing casualties
Casualties by type of explosive device in 
201425
In 2014, factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-
activated IEDs acting as antipersonnel mines caused 
the majority of all casualties (49% combined).26 The 
percentage of total casualties from factory-made 
antipersonnel mines decreased (18% in 2014, down from 
24 This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/military status 
was known.
25 This includes only the casualties for which the device type was known. 
The number of cluster submunition casualties was incomplete 
because casualties were not differentiated from other ERW casualties.
26 Calculated for casualties for which the specific type of victim-activated 
explosive item was known.
27% in 2013).27 The percentage of casualties from victim-
activated IEDs that act as antipersonnel mines increased 
significantly (up to 31%, from 22% in 2013). Afghanistan 
saw a large increase in the number of annual victim-
activated IED casualties: 809 in 2014, from 567 in 2013, 
but less than the peak of 987 in 2012. This accounted for 
most of the increase in victim-activated IED casualties in 
2014 globally.
In 2014, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were 
identified in nine states.28 Starting in 2008, the Monitor 
began identifying more casualties from these improvised 
antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their 
use and also to improved data collection that made it possible 
to better discern between factory-made antipersonnel mines 
and victim-activated IEDs, and between command-detonated 
IEDs and victim-activated IEDs. 
In 2014, antivehicle mines killed and injured 218 
people in 17 states and other areas, or 6% of casualties 
for which the device was known.29 The states with 
the greatest numbers of casualties from antivehicle 
mines were Pakistan (64) and Cambodia (35). In 2013, 
antivehicle mines similarly caused 212 casualties, or 7% 
of casualties for which the device was known.
In 2014, 31% of casualties were caused by ERW in 41 
states and areas, similar to the 34% recorded in 2013 and 
31% of casualties in 2012.30
27 In 2014, there were casualties from factory-made antipersonnel 
mines in 26 states and areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, India, 
Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Zimbabwe 
and three other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western 
Sahara.
28 Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Mali, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Fed-
eration, Thailand, and Tunisia.
29 In 2014, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the fol-
lowing states: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Cambodia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and two other 
areas: Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.
30 In 2014, casualties from ERW were identified in the following states: 
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Poland, 
Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, and two other areas: Kosovo and 
Somaliland. In addition to other types of ERW, casualties of unex-
ploded submunitions were identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, 
Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam. 
For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submu-
nitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the 
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States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2014
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Victim Assistance
T
his overview reports on the annual status of 
coordination and planning efforts designed to 
improve access to services and programs for 
survivors of landmine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) for the year 2014, with updates 
into 2015 when possible. It covers the activities 
and achievements in 31 States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW 
victims in need of assistance. It particularly assesses 
victim assistance in the context of the treaty’s Maputo 
Action Plan (2014–2019).31 It also looks at the role of sur-
vivors in decision-making and other relevant matters of 
concern. 
The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament 
or humanitarian law treaty in which States Parties 
committed to provide “assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, including the social and economic 
reintegration” of those people harmed by a specific type 
of weapon.32 Victim assistance, in practice, addresses the 
overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with 
disabilities, including survivors33 of landmines, cluster 
munitions, ERW, and other weapons, as well as people 
in their communities with similar requirements for 
assistance. 
In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach 
family members and other people who have been killed 
or who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due 
to mines/ERW. All of these people are considered “mine 
victims” according to the accepted definition of the term, 
which includes survivors as well as affected families and 
communities—although victim assistance efforts have 
mainly been limited to survivors to date. 
The Monitor has tracked the progress of programs 
and activities that benefit mine/ERW survivors, families, 
and communities under the Mine Ban Treaty and its 
subsequent five-year action plans since 1999. 
In June 2014 at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review 
31 This corresponds with Actions 12-18 of the Maputo Action Plan. The 
Monitor reports on the following 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties 
in which there are significant numbers of survivors: Afghanistan, 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, 
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, 
Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, 
and Zimbabwe. This list includes 29 States Parties that have indicated 
that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must 
provide care as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported 
hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clear-
ance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submis-
sions. Algeria, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 Extension 
Request, 31 March 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/
pdf/other_languages/french/MBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5_exten-
sions/countries/Algeria-ExtRequest-Revised-17Aug2011-fr.pdf; and 




32 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 
(Mine Ban Treaty) Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/
overview-and-convention-text/.
33 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
Conference in Maputo, all States Parties committed to the 
Maputo Action Plan, which includes a set of actions that 
would advance victim assistance through to 2019.34 In 
order to replace the previous victim assistance standing 
committee, in Maputo States Parties also agreed to the 
formation of a new Committee on Victim Assistance that 
will “support States Parties in their national efforts to 
strengthen and advance victim assistance.”35
Despite years of financial shortages that reduced 
the availability of actual services, victim assistance 
efforts have remained vibrant. A wide range of activities 
demonstrated the continued will of States Parties, the 
UN, NGOs, and above all survivors’ own networks and 
representative organizations to “tangibly contribute, 
to the full, equal and effective participation of mine 
victims in society,” even when confronted with limited 
resources.36
As shown by the many successful practices and 
activities, victim assistance is not inherently complicated. 
However, many challenges remain to ensure access 
to sustainable services, to remove the barriers to the 
full participation of survivors in their societies, and to 
create actual improvements in their wellbeing. It will 
require active cooperation and stronger determination to 
overcome these challenges. 
At a symposium on the Maputo Action Plan’s victim 
assistance commitments, held by Thailand in Bangkok 
in June 2015, the ICBL highlighted that, in carrying out 
the plan, States Parties can apply the many years of 
training and capacity-building already provided during 
the life of the convention, including on improving 
planning, monitoring, and evaluation.37 The ICBL also 
noted that a minimum level of clear and measurable 
objectives is needed. This was also highlighted in 
the evaluation of a multi-million dollar World Bank-
funded rehabilitation system from the early days of 
victim assistance. In response to inadequate reporting 
on project achievements, the evaluation found that 
“a simple monitoring system focused upon a few key 
variables relating project outputs to intended outcomes 
would have sufficed.”38
The Maputo Action Plan provides a framework that 
allows States Parties to qualitatively assess progress in 
34 “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreview-
conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-ad-
opted-27Jun2014.pdf.
35 “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 
27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/
APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf. 
36 Maputo Action Plan, Action #13. Until the Mine Ban Treaty Third 
Review Conference in 2014 there had been a Standing Committee on 
Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, which was orig-
inally titled the Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance, 
Socio-Economic Reintegration, and Mine Awareness. 
37 “Victim Assistance & the Framework of Maputo Action Plan,” Presen-
tation of ICBL, Bangkok, 15 June 2015.
38 Word Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, “Implementa-
tion Completion Report (ICR) Review - War Victims Project,” 12 
December 1999, http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/
InterLandingPagesByUNID/8525682E0068603785256913006EF367.
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victim assistance, which they can attribute to the relevant 
actions that they take, even in the absence of existing 
measurable baselines. It calls for activities addressing 
the specific needs of victims while also emphasizing the 
necessity of simultaneously integrating victim assistance 
into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions 
into the appropriate sectors, including disability, health, 
social welfare, education, employment, development, and 
poverty reduction.39 States Parties commit to addressing 
victim assistance objectives “with the same precision 
and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”40
The relevant content of the action points of the 
Maputo Action Plan, can be summarized as follows:
•	 Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and
gaps in services; support efforts to make referrals 
to existing services.
•	 Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
•	 Ensure the inclusion and full and active
participation of mine victims and their 
representative organizations in all matters that 
affect them; enhance capacity.
•	 Increase the availability of and accessibility to
services, opportunities, and social protection 
measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance 
coordination.
•	 Address the needs and guarantee rights in an age- 
and gender-sensitive manner.
•	 Communicate time-bound and measurable
objectives annually and report on measurable 
improvements in advance of the next Review 
Conference.
The Maputo Action Plan also affirms the need for 
States Parties to continue carrying out the actions of 
the previous five-year plan, the Cartagena Action Plan. 
The Cartagena Action Plan stressed the importance 
of the accessibility of services and information as 
well as the inclusion and participation of victims, 
particularly survivors, in all aspects of the treaty and its 
39 Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan.
40 “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3. 
implementation. It emphasized that with regards to the 
assistance provided, there should be no discrimination 
against mine/ERW victims, among mine/ERW victims, 
nor between survivors with disabilities and other persons 
with disabilities.41
Assessing the needs
States Parties should assess needs for victim assistance—
including through sex- and age-disaggregated data—and 
gauge the availability of services required. They should 
also use this opportunity to offer referrals to existing 
services.42 43
Needs assessment methods were improving and 
were increasingly linked to the provision of services in 
States Parties in Southeast Asia. However, much more 
needed to be done in Afghanistan to improve data 
collection.
•	 In Afghanistan, no specific needs assessment
surveys of mine/ERW survivors were conducted in 
2014, but the relevant ministry registered persons 
with war-related disabilities and the dependents 
of persons killed in conflict in order for them to 
receive a monthly social security allowance. An 
independent assessment by the national corruption 
watch body reported that the registration practices 
were seriously flawed and that the social security 
registration system required a massive overhaul.
•	 In Cambodia, the national survivors’ network in
partnership with the national mine action authority 
continued to conduct a large-scale survey on the 
quality of life for mine/ERW survivors and persons 
with disabilities. Data gathered was used to provide 
referrals, to enable follow-up, to address specific 
health, income-generating and educational needs, 
41 “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused 
by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 December 2009 (hereafter 
referred to as the “Cartagena Action Plan”).
42 According to Action #12 of the Maputo Action Plan.
43 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website providing more 
details on all countries highlighted in this chapter, www.the-monitor.
org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx. 
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as well as to provide emergency food for those 
people in the most difficult situations.
•	 In Thailand, the relevant government agencies 
improved interagency coordination for the 
registration of new mine/ERW casualties, as well 
as follow-up for assistance and support. The 
national mine action center made follow-up visits 
and provided small emergency funds for the urgent 
needs of some survivors.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, needs assessments 
were geographically localized and survivor surveys 
progressively covered affected areas in several countries:
•	 In Angola, the national survey for identifying and 
registering mine/ERW survivors with disabilities 
and assessing needs had covered half of all 18 
provinces in the country as of the end of 2014.
•	 In Burundi, the national mine action authority 
(DAHMI)44 in collaboration with Handicap 
International (HI) identified survivors and 
assessed needs in three (Makamba, Rutana, and 
Ruyigi) of its 17 provinces. 
•	 In Eritrea, the relevant government ministry and 
UNICEF carried out “mini assessments” during 
field monitoring activities. 
•	 In Sudan, the UN continued to work with disabled 
persons’ organizations (DPOs) and social workers 
to identify the needs of mine/ERW survivors 
through individual case studies. This information 
was shared with the relevant ministry and the 
national mine action center.
•	 In Uganda, the national network of NGOs, called 
the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association 
(ULSA), undertook a mine/ERW survivor needs 
assessment in the remote Yumbe District.
Surveys that also enhanced survivors’ links with 
state-provided services were reported in the Americas:
•	 In Colombia, from mid-2014 the national mine 
action authority (DAICMA)45 conducted a survey 
on the demographic, socio-economic, and 
cultural conditions of mine/ERW survivors, while 
informing them on how to register for services 
and benefits through the state process. Survey 
coverage increased. 
•	 In El Salvador, the state-run Protection Fund 
held roundtable consultations with survivors’ 
associations on survivors’ needs and made 
individual visits to provide legal support and links 
to assistance.
•	 In Peru, the mine action center CONTRAMINAS46 
verified and updated information on mine/ERW 
survivors and their needs. It also visited the remote 
regions of Junín and Huancavelica to update 
information on registered survivors, provide 
medical assistance, and identify mine survivors 
who remained unregistered. 
44 Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les Mines et Engins non 
explosés.
45 Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal.
46 Centro Peruano de Accion Contra las Minas Anti-Personal.
Progress in compiling data through assessment, 
although incomplete, was ongoing and making some 
progress in several countries in Europe:
•	 In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and 
medical needs of marginalized ERW survivors was 
conducted in eight affected regions in 2013–2014 
with the support of local government and branches 
of the national association of persons with work-
related disabilities. 
•	 Croatia progressed in the development of a unified 
database on casualties of mines/ERW and their 
families, with agreements made between relevant 
departments and agencies, a specific working group 
established, a dedicated staff member employed, 
and a combined database established. However, 
in 2015, there were insufficient funds to follow up 
with needs assessment in the field. The working 
group sought new approaches to implementing 
the needs survey, which was designed to inform 
the development of projects that would address 
the needs of survivors and their communities.
•	 In Serbia, the Ministry responsible for victim 
assistance announced plans to establish a database 
of members of disabled persons’ organizations, 
to be updated regularly on the current needs of 
individuals. 
•	 Turkey continued to monitor and report on 
survivors receiving care through the military 
medical system in 2014. In 2015, the national mine 
ban campaign in cooperation with the national 
disability association were collecting data on 
survivors in refugee camps in eastern Turkey.
In the Middle East and North Africa there was notably 
increased sharing and use of casualty data from recent 
surveys, in addition to some ongoing data collection:
•	 In Algeria, data from HI’s 2012 survivor 
identification process was used in the development 
of the new victim assistance action plan (March 
2014) and in the implementation of economic 
inclusion projects for mine/ERW survivors and 
persons with disabilities, funded by the relevant 
government ministry and the European Union.
•	 In Iraq, the national mine action authority based 
in Bagdad continued mine/ERW survivor survey 
efforts in 2014 and into 2015. A Basrah province 
survey was ongoing in 2015, to be completed in 
2016. It provided data and information on needs 
from the national survey and assessment to the 
relevant ministries. Mine action authorities also 
exchanged survivor information with the health 
ministry’s national injury surveillance system. 
•	 In Yemen, a significant number of mine/ERW survivors 
were registered in Abyan in 2013, while in 2014 some 
additional survivors were registered during the course 
of a victim assistance team conducting medical 
examinations and providing support.
Additionally, questions about disability, which were 
also relevant to survivors, were included in preparations 
for upcoming national censuses in El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
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and Uganda. This was encouraged and supported by 
survivor’s organizations. In Peru, the national disability 
council (CONADIS),47 a member of the national Victim 
Assistance Consultative Committee, was also working on 
a disability census.
47 Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad.
Enhancing plans, policies, and legal 
frameworks
Coordination
States Parties committed to enhancing coordination 
activities in order to increase the availability and 
Status of victim assistance efforts in 2014/2015
State Party Coordination 
(collaborative or combined 
with disability)
Plan for assistance Survivor participation 
(in coordination)
Afghanistan Yes (collaborative) Yes No (expired)
Albania Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
Algeria Yes (collaborative) Yes Draft victim assistance 
plan pending endorsement
Angola Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
Bosnia and Herzegovina No (inactive)* N/A* Yes
Burundi Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes (inactive)
Cambodia Yes (combined) Yes Yes (disability plan)
Chad No (ad hoc meetings) N/A (ad hoc meetings) Yes (inactive)
Colombia Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
Congo, DR No N/A No (component of mine 
action strategy)*
Croatia Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
El Salvador Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes (disability plan)
Eritrea No N/A No
Ethiopia Yes (combined) Yes Yes (disability plan)
Guinea-Bissau No N/A Yes
Iraq No N/A (ad hoc meetings) No
Jordan Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
Mozambique Yes (combined) Yes Yes (disability plan), draft 
victim assistance plan 
pending endorsement
Nicaragua No N/A No
Peru Yes (collaborative) Yes Yes
Senegal No N/A (ad hoc meetings) Yes
Serbia No N/A (ad hoc meetings) No
Somalia No N/A No
South Sudan Yes (combined) Yes No (component of mine 
action strategy)
Sudan Yes (collaborative) Yes No (expired)
Tajikistan Yes (combined) Yes Yes
Thailand Yes (collaborative) Yes (ad hoc meetings) Yes
Turkey No N/A No
Uganda Yes (combined), but 
inactive*
N/A Yes (victim assistance 
plan expired end 2014)*





Zimbabwe No N/A No
Note: Changes since Landmine Monitor 2014 marked with *. N/A = There was no active coordination mechanism in which survivors could 
participate. Ad hoc meetings = While there was no active coordination mechanism, survivors and their representative organizations met with 
relevant government authorities.
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accessibility of services that are relevant to mine 
victims.48 In 2014 and into 2015, 18 of the 31 States Parties 
had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms 
or disability coordination mechanisms that considered 
the issues relating to mine/ERW survivors’ needs.49
In Iraq, Senegal, Serbia, and Thailand there were no 
official multi-sectorial coordination meetings, but ad hoc 
meetings continued to take place during 2014. In the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq, coordination was hampered 
by significant funding capacity constraints. A victim 
assistance coordination mechanism was established in 
Serbia in early 2015. Ad hoc victim assistance meetings 
also began in Chad, taking place during 2014. In Somalia, 
a victim assistance and disability working group met for 
the first time in May 2014 and was intended to meet 
quarterly, but no meetings have taken place since.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), victim assistance 
coordination was put on hold in early 2014. The 
coordination mechanism for victim assistance in DR 
Congo was dissolved in 2013, and the closure of the 
UNMAS office in Kinshasa in 2014 saw coordination 
moved to the physical rehabilitation-focused cluster on 
disability (led by the World Health Organization, WHO), 
where victim assistance issues were not specifically 
addressed. In South Sudan, the victim assistance and 
disability working group held only one meeting between 
September 2014 and June 2015 due to funding difficulties. 
Previously, it was reported to have held monthly meetings. 
There were no meetings of the intersectoral disability 
committee responsible for victim assistance coordination 
in Uganda in 2014; meetings had becoming increasingly 
less frequent since 2013, also due to a lack of funding. In 
Yemen, coordination ceased due to armed conflict in 2015, 
not long after having been reactivated in 2013.
Among the 18 States Parties with active victim 
assistance coordination in 2014, all the national 
coordination mechanisms were reported to have either 
collaborated with, or been included as part of, an 
active disability coordination mechanism. In six States 
Parties, the designated national coordination body for 
victim assistance continued to also be the coordination 
mechanism for disability issues into 2015.50
Plans and objectives
Actions #13 and #14 of the Maputo Action Plan call 
on States Parties to have time-bound and measurable 
objectives to implement national policies and plans 
that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim 
assistance.
In 2014, of the 31 States Parties with significant 
numbers of survivors, 19 had plans with objectives that 
address the needs and promote the rights of mines 
48 According to the ongoing Cartagena Action Plan victim assistance 
commitments and supported by Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan.
49 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. States with no known 
or no active coordination mechanism for victim assistance in 2014: 
BiH, Chad, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua, 
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
50 Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and 
Uganda.
survivors.51 Plans in Burundi, Chad, and Yemen remained 
on hold, due to either a lack of resources and/or armed 
conflict.
Actions to respond to the needs of mine survivors 
had been incorporated into the national disability plans 
in Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, 
although these states did not have a distinct victim 
assistance plan. Algeria and Mozambique had developed 
victim assistance plans, which were pending official 
approval. Colombia, Peru, and Tajikistan had both a 
national victim assistance plan and disability plans and 
policies that take into account the needs and rights of 
mine/ERW survivors.52
In June 2014, Serbia announced that it had initiated 
the development of a national victim assistance plan 
through the newly forming working group on victim 
assistance.
Availability of and accessibility to services 
Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States 
Parties to “increase availability of and accessibility to 
appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services, 
economic inclusion opportunities and social protection 
measures…including expanding quality services in rural 
and remote areas and paying particular attention to 
vulnerable groups.”
Updates on the availability and accessibility of 
comprehensive rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors 
and other persons with disabilities are included in a 
separate report produced by the Monitor.53 This report, 
“Equal Basis 2015: Inclusion and Rights in 33 Countries,” 
presents progress in the relevant States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions54 
in the context of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. 
The Monitor website includes detailed country 
profiles discerning progress in victim assistance in some 
70 countries, including both States Parties and states 
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions.55
51 Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. States with 
no plan: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Serbia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. 
52 In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance 
was also integrated into efforts to address the needs of armed conflict 
victims more generally. 
53 See also, ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 
Countries,” 12 December 2014, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/
news/2014/equal-basis-2014-access-and-rights-in-33-countries.aspx.
54 The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR 
and Lebanon (States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), 
with significant numbers of cluster munition, landmine, and ERW 
victims. The "Equal Basis 2015" report is scheduled for publication in 
December 2015.
55 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-mon-
itor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.aspx. Findings specific 
to victim assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster 
munitions are available through Landmine Monitor 2015’s companion 
publication; ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 (Geneva: 
ICBL-CMC, August 2015), www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/
cluster-munition-monitor-2015.aspx.
Landmine monitor 2015  /  35
Casualties and Victim Assistance
Full and active participation 
Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States 
Parties to ensure the “full and active participation of 
mine victims and their representative organizations in all 
matters that affect them.” 
Mine/ERW survivors’ representatives were members 
of most existing victim assistance coordination 
mechanisms. However, there remains a long way to go 
for survivors to be effectively included in coordination 
roles in a way that their input is listened to, understood, 
and acted upon with tangible measures in the context 
of the design and implementation of victim assistance 
objectives. Most States Parties are yet to demonstrate 
that they are doing their utmost to enhance the capacity 
of survivors for their effective participation, or to specify 
the methods that they are using to build that capacity.
Among the 18 States Parties with active victim 
assistance coordination during 2014, all but one (Yemen) 
included survivors in these mechanisms. However, in 
many cases there remained a need to build the capacity 
of survivors’ representatives and raise awareness in the 
coordination bodies in order for inclusion to be fuller and 
participation more active. 
Mine/ERW survivors also participated actively in 
Mine Ban Treaty and other disarmament and disability 
rights coordination and campaigning, as well as in 
matters of peacemaking and peace-building in many 
countries, including in Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. In Colombia, 
members of National Network of Landmine Victims and 
Survivors’ Organizations, formed in December 2013, 
represented the perspectives of mine/ERW survivors in 
the Colombian peace process national committee, as 
well as at the peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba in 2015. 
The strong involvement of female mine/ERW 
survivors in peace issues was evident in the Director 
of the Uganda Landmine Survivors Association—who 
is also an ICBL Ambassador—joining the 2014 Women 
Peace Makers Program of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for 
Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego (US). 
A female survivor leader from Thailand also participated 
in a seminar at the UN in New York in July 2014, as part 
of Thailand’s efforts to promote the women, peace, 
and security agenda associated with Security Council 
Resolution 1325.
In the majority of the 31 States Parties, survivors 
continued to be involved in implementing many aspects 
of victim assistance, including physical rehabilitation, 
peer support and referral, income-generating projects, 
and needs assessment data collection.56
Communicating objectives and reporting 
improvements
After 15 years of Mine Ban Treaty reporting, there was 
no agreed format for victim assistance reporting. Many 
56 Participation in service and program implementation was reported in 
at least the following 26 States Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Croatia, 
El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, 
Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.
States Parties reported progress similarly to the way they 
had in past years, by including a mix of casualty data, 
updates on victim assistance services provided, and 
occasionally information on laws and policies. While 
more than half of the most-affected 31 States Parties 
had included some information on victim assistance 
activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports 
covering calendar year 2014,57 no States Parties had 
reported directly on their time-bound and measurable 
objectives by the ambitiously narrow timeframe of 30 
April 2015, as specified in Maputo Action Plan Action 
#13. However, according to the plan, the objectives 
should be updated, their implementation monitored, and 
progress reported annually. Each year, “enhancements” 
to plans, policies, and legal frameworks and budgets 
for the implementation of those plans, policies, and 
legal frameworks should also be reported. By the next 
reporting period, States Parties with significant numbers 
of survivors and needs for assistance will have less than 
four years to adopt and apply an adequate reporting 
method for indicating that their efforts have improved the 
well-being and guaranteed rights of survivors, families, 
and communities before the next Review Conference.
Gender considerations
The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to 
address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine 
victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”58 While 
men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, 
women and girls may be disproportionally disadvantaged 
as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple 
forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-
based approach to victim assistance for women and girls, 
States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). Implementation of CEDAW by States 
Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of 
women and girls and protect them from discrimination 
and exploitation.59 The Committee of CEDAW General 
Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, 
conflict, and post-conflict situations and General 
Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of 
their human rights, are also particularly applicable. 
Some States Parties have begun to address gender 
issues, often with assistance from the NGO Gender and 
Mine Action Programme. For example, in 2014, the Mine 
Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan developed 
and adopted a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for 2014–
2016 (including victim assistance) and established focal 
points and an implementation working group.
57 The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance 
were: Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajik-
istan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Sudan reported that it did not have any 
victim assistance activities due to a lack of funding, and Thailand 
reported on a one-time event. 
58 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.
59 As of 1 June 2015, CEDAW had 189 States Parties. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
New York, 18 December 1979, treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.
aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-8&chapter=4&lang=en.
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Age considerations
Children, and in particular boys, are one of the largest 
groups of casualties and survivors. Child survivors have 
specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. 
Incremental progress in addressing the specific needs 
of child survivors was reported in some domains of 
assistance, particularly psychosocial support and 
education. The annually updated Monitor fact sheet on 
the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more 
details on issues pertaining to children, youths, and 
adolescents.
Special issues of concern: displacement,  
conflict, and humanitarian emergencies
This Monitor reporting period was marked by growing 
numbers of refugees and displaced persons resulting 
from conflict, as well as by the impact of conflict and 
natural disasters gravely affecting victim assistance 
efforts in a number of States Parties. During natural 
disasters, humanitarian emergencies, and times of 
armed conflict or occupation, mine/ERW survivors face 
heighted challenges to having their rights respected 
and fulfilled, as well as increased barriers to accessing 
adequate and appropriate services60. 
In October 2015, flash rains and massive floods 
destroyed houses and infrastructure in the Sahrawi 
refugee camps where hundreds of survivors live with little 
outside support. The camps are situated near Tindouf in 
Algeria, near Western Sahara. Earlier in 2015, the World 
Food Programme in Algeria had to reduce the number 
of essential food items distributed to Sahrawi refugees, 
including mine/ERW survivors, by 20%. UN agencies 
present in the camps were jointly advocating for the most 
basic needs of these refugees to be covered and not to 
be forgotten.61
In 2014, catastrophic flooding in BiH and Serbia 
affected a significant number of landmine survivors 
and their families, some of whom lost their homes and 
other resources. About half of all known survivors in BiH 
were reported to be in flood-affected areas. The flooding 
disrupted victim assistance activities in both countries. 
In Serbia, floods caused both the state and many local 
NGOs to re-prioritize their programming to focus on 
relief for flood victims. This caused a general reduction in 
services and programs for Serbian mine/ERW survivors, 
as funds were diverted for emergency relief. During relief 
efforts, media statements by the mine action center of 
BiH urged special attention to the needs of mine/ERW 
survivors. In Serbia, survivors also participated in relief 
efforts, including by distributing food and water, and the 
survivors’ organizations reallocated project funding to 
60 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Landmines/ERW, Ref-
ugees, and Displacement,” 20 June 2015,” www.the-monitor.org/
media/2034850/MonitorBriefingPaper_Refugees_20June2015_
final2.pdf; and “Victim Assistance and CRPD Article 11: Situations 
of risk and humanitarian emergencies,” 25 June 2015, www.the-mon-
itor.org/media/2034853/MonitorBriefingPaper_VAandArticle11_
25June2015.pdf.
61 World Food Programme, “UN Agencies In Algeria Urge Continued 
Food Assistance To Refugees From Western Sahara,” 25 February 
2015, www.wfp.org/news/news-release/un-agencies-algeria-urge-con-
tinued-food-assistance-refugees-western-sahara.
assist those most affected.
The conflict in Syria has caused a massive 
displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally 
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, 
as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of 
persons who have fled Syria. While all these host countries 
have victim assistance commitments and obligations, 
the influx of refugees created additional challenges 
in providing assistance and access to services for 
landmine survivors and other refugees with disabilities. 
In Iraq, healthcare centers and hospitals in the Kurdistan 
region were overwhelmed by the number of refugees in 
need entering from Syria during 2014, especially when 
combined with the increase in internal displacement. In 
Jordan, wounded Syrians received immediate medical 
care and humanitarian organizations provided some 
psychological support and rehabilitation services for war-
injured persons. In Turkey, initial emergency medical care 
is provided locally, but the costs of physical rehabilitation, 
mobility aids, and plastic surgery were not covered by 
government services, and the availability of these relied 
on non-governmental and international organizations.
Conflict, insecurity, and armed violence severely 
disrupted the availability and delivery of services in 
South Sudan. This was also reported to be the case in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen in 2014 and 2015.
Support for Mine Action
A
rticle 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on interna-
tional cooperation and assistance recog-
nizes the right of each State Party to seek and 
receive assistance from other States Parties 
in fulfilling its treaty obligations. While this 
chapter focuses on financial support for 
mine action by affected countries and on 
international mine action assistance reported by donor 
states for calendar year 2014, cooperation and assistance 
is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms 
of assistance can include the provision of equipment, 
expertise, and personnel as well as the exchange of expe-
rience, know-how, and best-practice sharing. 
Key Figures 
•	 Thirty-three donors and 13 affected states reported 
contributing approximately US$610.4 million in 
international and national support for mine action 
in 2014;1 $30.4 million less than in 2013 (a 5% 
decrease).2 
•	 International contributions accounted for 68% 
of overall support for mine action in 2014, while 
states’ contributions to their own national mine 
action programs accounted for the remaining 32% 
of global funding. 
•	 Donors contributed $416.8 million in international 
support for mine action to 42 affected states and 
three other areas. This represents a decrease of 
$23 million from 2013 (a 5% decrease).
•	 Contributions from the top five donors—the United 
States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan, 
Norway, and the Netherlands—accounted for 72% 
1  This figure represents reported government contributions under bilat-
eral and international programs for calendar year 2014, as of November 
2015. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current 
dollars. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, 
cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggre-
gated. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail 
and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year. 
2  Support for mine action in 2013 has been recalculated from that 
reported in Landmine Monitor 2014. The Monitor now reports $640.8 
million in total support in 2013, instead of $647 million. 
of all international funding with $301.8 million.
•	 The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao 
PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—received 45% 
of all international contributions. 
•	 Support to mine action activities in Afghanistan 
dropped considerably, from $67.5 million in 2013 
to $49.3 million in 2014, although it was still 30% 
higher than funding received by the second largest 
recipient (Lao PDR: $37.3 million).
•	 International funding was distributed among the 
following sectors: clearance and risk education 
(68% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), 
advocacy (5%), capacity-building (4%), and 
stockpile destruction (less than 1%). The remaining 
16% was not disaggregated by the donors. 
•	 The Monitor identified 13 affected states that 
provided $193.6 million in contributions to their 
own national mine action programs, $7 million 
less than in 2013 (a 4% decrease), when 18 affected 
countries reported contributing $201 million.
International Contributions  
in 2014
In 2014, 33 donors contributed $416.8 million in 
international support for mine action. This represents a 
decrease of $23 million (5%) from the $440 million reported 
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in 2013. Support went to 42 affected states and three other 
areas (down from 47 states and three areas in 2013) with 
$58 million not earmarked for any specific country.
While this is the second year in a row that international 
assistance to mine action has declined, it has totaled more 
than $400 million for the ninth consecutive year. It is too 
early to speak of a continuing downward trend, but the 
Monitor will continue to closely follow future developments. 
Over the past five years (2010–2014), international 
support totaled $2.3 billion, an average of $460 million 
per year. Three donors—the US, Japan, and Norway—
contributed $1.1 billion, almost 50% of total international 
support. Four other donors—the EU, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Australia—contributed more than 
$100 million each.
Donors in 2014
In 2014, 26 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, three states 
not party, the EU, and three international institutions3 
contributed a total of $416.8 million to mine action. 
The majority of the funding came from just a few 
donors. The top five donors contributed a total of 
$301.8 million, representing almost three-quarters of 
all international funding for 2014. The US remained the 
largest mine action donor, followed by the EU, Japan, 
3  The Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for Inter-
national Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (OSCE). 
Norway, and the Netherlands. Two countries entered the 
top 10—Denmark and Finland—replacing Australia and 
Sweden, which reduced their contributions by a combined 
total of $13 million. Thirteen donors contributed less 
than $1 million each.
Support from States Parties in 2014 accounted for 
55% of all donor funding with 26 countries providing 
approximately $230 million, down from a total of $278 
million in 2013. The top five State Party contributors—
Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
Germany—provided $152 million (36%).
In 2014, the EU and its member states4 contributed 
a total of $166 million and accounted for 40% of total 
international support reported, up from the $153 million 
provided in 2013 (35% of total international funding in 
2013). 
Based on available data as of November 2015, 
funding for mine action in 2014 decreased by $23 million. 
Twelve donors decreased their funding, led by Japan ($15 
million down), the UK ($10 million down), Australia ($8 
million down), Norway ($8 million down), and Sweden 
($5 million down). 
In contrast, 11 donors contributed more in 2014 than 
they did in 2013, including a $28 million increase from the 
EU, notably through the disbursement of approximately 
4 Seventeen EU member states provided funding in 2014: Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slo-
venia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK). 




2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
US 118.1 113.9 134.4 131.4 129.6 627.4
EU 66.8 38.5 60.7 19.3 49.8 235.1
Japan 49.1 64.0 57.6 43.0 46.8 260.5
Norway 41.8 49.6 48.4 53.4 50.3 243.5
Netherlands 25.9 23.4 24.1 21.3 22.8 117.5
Switzerland 18.1 20.6 18.4 17.5 15.7 90.3
Germany 17.5 22.1 23.8 23.6 23.4 110.4
United Kingdom (UK) 13.1 22.8 22.0 18.0 16.3 92.2
Denmark 12.1 9.3 8.7 9.3 10.2 49.6
Finland 8.0 7.7 7.2 7.4 6.7 37.0
Sweden 7.8 12.9 14.1 12.2 13.0 60.0
Canada 7.7 7.9 6.8 17.0 30.1 69.5
New Zealand 7.5 6.7 5.4 4.3 3.3 27.2
Australia 6.6 14.5 24.0 45.7 24.4 115.2
Ireland 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.0 4.5 20.7
Belgium 3.2 3.1 7.2 8.1 11.9 33.5
Italy 2.2 1.5 2.8 3.4 4.0 13.9
Luxembourg 1.5 1.9 1.2 1.2 0.9 6.7
France 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.3 3.6 10.3
Spain 1.1 1.6 1.9 5.3 5.4 15.3
Other donors** 2.9 11.6 23.2 21.0 7.7 66.4
Total 416.8 439.8 497.5 467.7 480.4 2,302.2
* The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.
** Other donors in 2014 included: Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South 
Korea, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Each contributed less than $1 million.
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$25 million to mine action projects in Angola. The US 
provided $4.2 million more than in 2013, while Denmark 
and the Netherlands increased their assistance by more 
than $2 million each. 
Three donors from 2013 did not report any contribution 
to mine action in 2014: Colombia, Oman, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), the latter of which provided more 
than $9 million in 2013. Five new donors—one State Party, 
one state not party, and three institutions—were identified 
in 2014: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Common Humanitarian 
Fund (Sudan), the OPEC Fund for International 
Development, and the OSCE. 
However, as shown in the table above, changes in the 
exchange rates between national currencies and the US 
dollar significantly affected the US dollar value of some 
contributions. For instance, whereas Japan has provided 
¥5.2 billion in 2014, ¥1 billion less than in 2013 and 
representing a 17% decrease, the value of its contribution 
when expressed in US dollars results in a 23% decrease. 
Similarly, Canada’s contribution dropped by 4% in US 
dollar terms during 2014, despite rising by 3% in national 
currency terms. 
Funding paths
In addition to bilateral aid, donors provided funding 
via several trust fund mechanisms, including the UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), 
administered by UNMAS; the ITF Enhancing Human 
Security (established by the government of Slovenia); the 
Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan; and the NATO 
Partnership for Peace Fund.
In 2014, contributions to the VTF totaled $45.1 million 
from 22 donors, compared to $51 million from 23 donors in 
2013.5 Japan, the EU, and Australia were the largest donors 
to the VTF, amounting to half of all contributions. Several 
small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action, 
including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Korea. Six donors and two international 
institutions allocated $8 million in 2014 through the ITF for 
mine action programs in nine states and one area, as well 
as for global activities.6 Other organizations that received 
5  UNMAS, Annual Report 2014, September 2015, pp. 22–23, www.
mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNMAS 2014 Annual 
Report.pdf.
6  ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2014, March 2015, pp. 
Summary of major changes in 2014
Change Donors Combined Total
Decrease of more than $5 
million
Australia, Japan, Norway, the UK, and Sweden $45.4 million decrease
Decrease of less than $5 
million
Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Spain, and Switzerland
$10.2 million decrease
Increase of more than $1 
million
Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, and the US $37.8 million increase
Increase of less than $1 
million
Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Italy, New 
Zealand, Slovenia, and South Korea
$2.9 million increase
Donors from 2013 that 
discontinued their support 
in 2014
Colombia, Oman, and the UAE $9.5 million provided in 
2013
New donors in 2014 Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Common Humanitarian 
Fund, OPEC Fund for International Development, 
and the OSCE
$1.4 million provided in 
2014
Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms* 
Donors Amount of decrease/
increase (national 
currency)




% change from 
2013 (US$)
Australia - A$7,588,000 -51% -7,832,774 -54%
Canada + C$281,373 +3% -279,639 -4%
Japan - ¥1,056,301,774 -17% -14,914,242 -23%
New Zealand + NZ$892,460 +11% +830,399 +12%
Norway - NOK28,211,631 -10% -7,785,827 -16%
Sweden - SEK30,730,000 -37% -5,129,558 -39%
Switzerland - CHF347,941 -2% -137,561 -1%
UK - £6,605,855 -45% -9,661,924 -42%
* Average exchange rates for 2014: A$1=US$0.9034; C$1.1043=US$1; DKK5.6151=US$1; €1=US$1.3297; ¥105.74=US$1; NZ$0.8313=US$1; 
NOK6.2969=US$1; £1=US$1.6484; SEK6.8576=US$1; and CHF0.9147=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 
January 2015, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.
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a significant proportion of contributions in 2014 included 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
($18.2 million) and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($10.7 million). 
Recipients
A total of 42 states and three other areas received $358.8 
million from 33 donors in 2014. A further $58 million, 
designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to 
institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without 
a designated recipient state or area. Most advocacy 
funding is contained within this category of funding. 
Of the 45 recipients in 2014, 29 states and one other 
area received more than $1 million each. Afghanistan 
received the largest amount of funding ($49.3 million) 
from the largest number of donors (14). Twelve states, or 
27% of all recipients, had only one donor.7
As in previous years, a small number of countries received 
the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—
Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Angola, and Cambodia—
received 45% of all international support in 2014. 





Global 58.0 Libya 6.9
Afghanistan 49.3 Ukraine 6.6
Lao PDR 37.3 Egypt 6.3
Iraq 36.3 Lebanon 6.1
Angola 32.6 Myanmar 5.7
Cambodia 30.3 Tajikistan 4.2
Turkey 26.3 Palau 2.3
Vietnam 14.3 Zimbabwe 2.2
Colombia 11.5 Somaliland 1.7
South Sudan 10.8 Syria 1.4
Mozambique 10.3 Georgia 1.3
Congo, DR 10.3 Yemen 1.2




Sri Lanka 8.4 Serbia 1.0




Note: State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; 
other areas are indicated by italics.
* Other recipients in 2014 included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Burundi, Croatia, Guinea, Jordan, Kosovo, the Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Sudan, 
and Western Sahara. Each received less than $1 million.
In 2014, 35 states and areas experienced a change of 
more than 20% in funding compared to 2013, including 
24 recipients receiving less support. Turkey was the 
recipient with the largest upward fluctuation, receiving 
$26 million more than in 2013, while Afghanistan was 
the recipient with the largest downward fluctuation, 
22–23, www.itf-fund.si/public/upload/brosure/itf_ar_2014.pdf.
7  Albania, Armenia, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, the Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Turkey.
receiving $18 million less than in 2013. Fluctuation may 
be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities, changes in 
local situations, as well as the closing of some programs. 
Uncertain and changing levels of mine action support 
received could negatively impact the ability of some 
affected states to comply with their Mine Ban Treaty 
obligations in a timely manner. Such concerns were for 
instance raised by Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, 
and Zimbabwe regarding their clearance obligations, and 
by Ukraine regarding its stockpile destruction obligation.8
Funding by thematic sector











Victim assistance 27.7 7%
Advocacy 20.7 5%
Capacity-building 14.9 4%
Stockpile destruction 3.2  less than 1%
Total 416.8 100%
Almost 70% of mine action funding in 2014 supported 
clearance and risk education activities. Victim assistance 
support dropped by $1.9 million from 2013, and 
represented 7% of total international support to mine 
action. Stockpile destruction totaled just more than 
$3 million, most of which was provided by the EU 
and Germany for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1 
landmines through the NATO Support Agency (with a 
total of $2.5 million).10
8  Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA), Annual Report 1393, 
September 2015, p. 40, www.macca.org.af/macca/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/MAPA-Annual-Report-1393.pdf; “Lack of funding 
could jeopardize demining operations in Angola” (in Portuguese), 
Deutsche Welle (DW), 9 July 2015, www.dw.com/pt/falta-de-financia-
mento-põe-em-risco-a-desminagem-em-angola/a-18574335; “Money 
a worry for deminers ahead of 2019 clean-up deadline,” The Phnom 
Penh Post, 6 June 2015, www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/
money-worry-deminers-ahead-2019-clean-deadline; statement of 
Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014, 
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tues-
day/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Chad.pdf; Zimbabwe’s Fourth 
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013, 
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-
areas/art5_extensions/countries/Zimbabwe-ExtensionRequest-Re-
ceived-31JDecember2013.pdf; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban 
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Updates by States Parties that have 
missed their deadlines for Article 4 implementation, April 2014, www.
apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/7_
ARTICLE_4_STATES_PARTIES_MISSED_DEADLINES_-_Ukraine.pdf. 
9  In 2013, international support was distributed among the following 
sectors: clearance and risk education ($300.3 million/68% of total inter-
national support), victim assistance ($29.6 million/7%), advocacy ($16 
million/4%), capacity-building ($9.4 million/2%), stockpile destruction 
($5.2 million/1%), and various activities ($79.3 million/18%). 
10  Email from Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, Conventional Weapons and Space Division (K1), European 
External Action Service (EEAS), 11 June 2015; and Germany Mine Ban 
Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 16 March 2015.
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Clearance and risk education
In 2014, $281.8 million, or 68% of all reported support for mine 
action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. 
This represents a decrease of $18.5 million from 2013.
Many donors reported clearance and risk education 
as a combined figure, although clearance accounts for 
most of the reported funding with 23 donors contributing 
$237.9 million. Nine donors reported contributions 
totaling $8 million specifically for risk education projects 
in nine countries.
Victim assistance11
Direct international support for victim assistance activities 
reached $27.7 million in 2014, down from $29.6 million in 
2013. This represents 7% of all reported support for mine 
action in 2014, about the same share as in 2013. 
Seventeen12 of the 33 donors identified reported 
contributing to victim assistance projects in 14 States 
Parties, four states not party, and one area.13 Most mine-
affected countries did not receive any direct international 
support for victim assistance.
Advocacy
In 2014, 5% of all reported support for mine action 
went toward advocacy activities ($20.7 million). Of the 
33 donors reporting international contributions to mine 
action, 18 reported supporting advocacy activities.
Advocacy activities included, but were not limited to, 
support for the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference 
in Maputo in June 2014 and the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San Jose 
in September 2014; travel sponsorship through UNDP; 
and, contributions to the Implementation Support Units. 
GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine 
and Cluster Munition Monitor also received donor 
support for advocacy. 
National Contributions in 2014
While there has been more transparency from affected 
states, overall national contributions to mine action 
continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report 
national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States 
Parties such as Algeria and Iraq, as well as states not party 
India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states 
with significant contamination and major clearance 
operations, usually conducted by the army—have never 
reported annual expenditures. In March 2014, the media 
reported that the government’s contribution to demining 
11  Funding for victim assistance activities are especially difficult to track 
because many donors report that they provide support for victims 
through more general programs for development and the rights of 
persons with disabilities.
12  Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, and the US. 
13  States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assis-
tance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Colombia, Croatia, DR Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received interna-
tional assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Palestine, and Vietnam. Western Sahara was the sole other area that 
received victim assistance funding. 
in Vietnam was around $30 million per year.14
Thirteen affected states reported $193.6 million in 
contributions to mine action from their national budget 
in 2014, approximately $7 million less than the $201 
million reported in 2013 (a 4% decrease).15 Angola ($121 
million) accounted for 63% of the total. Additionally, four 
States Parties reported contributing a large part to their 
own mine action programs: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
($14.6 million, 63%), Chile ($4.9 million, 100%), Croatia 
($28 million, 60%), and Ecuador ($5.5 million, 100%). 
Whereas data about national support remains 
incomplete, it has accounted to about 30% of total mine 
action funding in 2010–2014. 
Summary of contributions: 2010–2014
Peacekeeping Operations
Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic, Côte 
d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Somalia, South 
Sudan, and Sudan (Abyei16 and Darfur), as well as 
Western Sahara, had mine action programs that were 
partially funded by UN General Assembly assessments 
as part of peacekeeping mission budgets in 2014. 
In 2014–2015, an estimated $166 million was allocated 
to mine action for peacekeeping missions globally, a 
10% increase from the previous year.17 The breakdown 
of assessed budget per mission was not available as of 
November 2015. 
14  “VN calls on donors to help with clean up of explosives,” Vietnam 
News, 15 March 2014, vietnamnews.vn/society/252370/vn-calls-on-
donors-to-help-with-clean-up-of-explosives.html. The information pro-
vided, however, was not specific enough and therefore not included 
Monitor calculations.
15  Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, 
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
16 The Abyei region is located in the Southern Kordofan state in Sudan. 
17  UNMAS, “Overview of UNMAS Funding,” undated but last accessed 









International Support National Support

Status of the Convention
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature 
from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which 
was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is 
signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the 
treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign 
rather they may become bound without signature through 
a one step procedure known as accession. According to 
Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State 
that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) 
and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 18 November 2015 there were 162 State Parties  
States Parties
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99 
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a) 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
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Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00 
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
Signatories








































Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 




Determined to put an end to the suffering and casu-
alties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim 
hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and 
defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct 
economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the 
repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
and have other severe consequences for years after 
emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to con-
tribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face 
the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed 
throughout the world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for 
the care and rehabilitation, including the social and eco-
nomic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines 
would also be an important confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim-
inate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this 
Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States 
to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding interna-
tional agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the 
past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming 
at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stock-
piling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the 
principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total 
ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts 
to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, the International Cam-
paign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-gov-
ernmental organizations around the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 
and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the 
international community to negotiate an international 
and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stock-
piling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adher-
ence of all States to this Convention, and determined to 
work strenuously towards the promotion of its universal-
ization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United 
Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional orga-
nizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed 
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international 
humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed 
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employ-
ment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the 
principle that a distinction must be made between civil-
ians and combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any 
circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
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b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indi-
rectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone 
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 2
Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to 
be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or 
more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, 
are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of 
being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed 
under, on or near the ground or other surface area and 
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to 
protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached 
to or placed under the mine and which activates when an 
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intention-
ally disturb the mine. 
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical move-
ment of anti-personnel mines into or from national ter-
ritory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, 
but does not involve the transfer of territory containing 
emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due 
to the presence or suspected presence of mines.
Article 3
Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 
1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti- personnel 
mines for the development of and training in mine detec-
tion, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is 
permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed 
the minimum number absolutely necessary for the 
above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose 
of destruction is permitted.
Article 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-
personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party under-
takes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stock-
piled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that 
are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible 
but not later than four years after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party.
Article 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in 
mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but 
not later than ten years after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all 
areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-per-
sonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced 
and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-per-
sonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected 
by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclu-
sion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained 
therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least 
be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim-
inate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy 
or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines 
referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may 
submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or 
a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline 
for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel 
mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the pro-
posed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted 
under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available 
to the State Party for the destruction of all the 
anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the 
State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines 
in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environ-
mental implications of the extension; and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for 
the proposed extension. 
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Con-
ference shall, taking into consideration the factors con-
tained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by 
a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting 
whether to grant the request for an extension period.
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6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submis-
sion of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 
4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension 
period a State Party shall submit relevant additional 
information on what has been undertaken in the previous 
extension period pursuant to this Article.
Article 6
International cooperation and 
assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each 
State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, 
where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent 
possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have 
the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, material and scientific and technological 
information concerning the implementation of this 
Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue 
restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equip-
ment and related technological information for humani-
tarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide 
assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and 
economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine 
awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, 
inter alia, through the United Nations system, interna-
tional, regional or national organizations or institutions, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, national 
Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their Interna-
tional Federation, non-governmental organizations, or 
on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide 
assistance for mine clearance and related activities. 
Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the 
United Nations system, international or regional organi-
zations or institutions, non-governmental organizations 
or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing 
to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assis-
tance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal 
with demining. 
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide 
assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti- per-
sonnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information 
to the database on mine clearance established within 
the United Nations system, especially information con-
cerning various means and technologies of mine clear-
ance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, 
regional organizations, other States Parties or other 
competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora 
to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national 
demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine 
problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources 
that are required for the implementation of the 
program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the 
jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence 
of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the 
concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, 
inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that 
will work in the implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance 
under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a 




1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any 
event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to 
in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines 
owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or 
control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity 
and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-per-
sonnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined 
areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-
personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to 
include as much detail as possible regarding the type 
and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in 
each mined area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers 
of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for 
the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or 
transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as 
the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain 
or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with 
Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-
commissioning of anti-personnel mine production 
facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-
personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, 
including details of the methods which will be used in 
destruction, the location of all destruction sites and 
the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines 
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destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quan-
tity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in 
accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along 
with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-
personnel mine in the case of destruction in accor-
dance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-
personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and 
those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, 
giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of 
information as may facilitate identification and clear-
ance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this 
information shall include the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photo-
graphs and other information which may facilitate 
mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and 
effective warning to the population in relation to all 
areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this 
Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, 
covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April 
of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.
Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of 
compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate 
with each other regarding the implementation of the 
provisions of this Convention, and to work together in 
a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States 
Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek 
to resolve questions relating to compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it 
may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to 
that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied 
by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall 
refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care 
being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a 
Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the 
requesting State Party all information which would assist 
in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within 
that time period, or deems the response to the Request for 
Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, 
accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to 
the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such 
information shall be presented to the requested State Party 
which shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States 
Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exer-
cise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification 
requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening 
of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the 
matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
thereupon communicate this proposal and all informa-
tion submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all 
States Parties with a request that they indicate whether 
they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for 
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that 
within 14 days from the date of such communication, at 
least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special 
Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties 
within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall 
consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special 
Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall 
first determine whether to consider the matter further, 
taking into account all information submitted by the 
States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If 
despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been 
reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States 
Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the 
Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of 
the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are 
authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the 
States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties 
shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on 
its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and 
voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission 
shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the 
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties 
to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of 
up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional infor-
mation on the spot or in other places directly related to 
the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or 
control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities 
and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by 
States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. 
Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as des-
ignated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party 
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declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of 
non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- 
finding missions on the territory or any other place under 
the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if 
the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appoint-
ment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the 
States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after 
consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the 
members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission 
or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the 
mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall 
enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the 
fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the 
requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The 
requested State Party shall take the necessary adminis-
trative measures to receive, transport and accommodate 
the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the 
security of the mission to the maximum extent possible 
while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested 
State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into 
the territory of the requested State Party the necessary 
equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering 
information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its 
arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party 
of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of 
its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure 
that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to 
speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the 
fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under 
its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue 
could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject 
to any arrangements that the requested State Party con-
siders necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information 
and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the 
requested State Party may have with regard to propri-
etary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitu-
tional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members 
of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such 
arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to 
demonstrate through alternative means its compliance 
with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory 
of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, 
and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless 
otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related 
to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be 
treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting 
of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States 
Parties the results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, 
including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, 
and may request the requested State Party to take mea-
sures to address the compliance issue within a specified 
period of time. The requested State Party shall report on 
all measures taken in response to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special 
Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States 
Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or 
resolve the matter under consideration, including the 
initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with 
international law. In circumstances where the issue at 
hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond 
the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of 
the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States 
Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including 
the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special 
Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to 
reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by 
consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States 
Parties present and voting.
Article 9
National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, adminis-
trative and other measures, including the imposition of 
penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity pro-
hibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken 
by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 10
Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with 
each other to settle any dispute that may arise with 
regard to the application or the interpretation of this 
Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute 
before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute 
to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it 
deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, 
calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the 
settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this 
Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
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Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to con-
sider any matter with regard to the application or imple-
mentation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under 
the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accor-
dance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties 
as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be con-
vened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
within one year after the entry into force of this Conven-
tion. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations shall convene a 
Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as 
the United Nations, other relevant international orga-
nizations or institutions, regional organizations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant 
non-governmental organizations may be invited to 
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
Article 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry 
into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences 
shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, pro-
vided that the interval between Review Conferences shall 
in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this 
Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this 
Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between 
further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties 
as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions 
related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as 
the United Nations, other relevant international orga-
nizations or institutions, regional organizations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant 
non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend 
each Review Conference as observers in accordance with 
the agreed Rules of Procedure.
Article 13 
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Conven-
tion any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be 
communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to 
all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an 
Amendment Conference should be convened to consider 
the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the 
Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that 
they support further consideration of the proposal, the 
Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to 
which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as 
the United Nations, other relevant international orga-
nizations or institutions, regional organizations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant 
non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend 
each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance 
with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held imme-
diately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a 
Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties 
request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted 
by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present 
and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Deposi-
tary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to 
the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into 
force for all States Parties to this Convention which have 
accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of 
instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. 
Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining 




1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the 
Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Confer-
ences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by 
the States Parties and States not parties to this Conven-
tion participating therein, in accordance with the United 
Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of 
any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States 
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessment adjusted appropriately.




This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 
1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by 
all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, 
and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York 
from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
Article 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has 
not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
Article 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day 
of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces-
sion has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of 
the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, accep-
tance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter 
into force on the first day of the sixth month after the 
date on which that State has deposited its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, declare that it will apply provision-
ally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending 
its entry into force.
Article 19
Reservations




1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sover-
eignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States 
Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations 
Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this 
withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after 
the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depos-
itary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, 
the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed con-
flict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of 
the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention 
shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant 
rules of international law.
Article 21
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby 
designated as the Depositary of this Convention.
Article 22
Authentic texts 
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
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Appendix
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AXO abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC battle area clearance
CCW 1980 Convention on Conventional 
Weapons
CHA confirmed hazardous area
CMC Cluster Munition Coalition
DfID UK Department for International 
Development
DPO disabled persons’ organization
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERW explosive remnants of war
EU European Union
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humani-
tarian Demining
HI Handicap International
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine 
Action
ISU Implementation Support Unit
NGO non-governmental organization
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
NSAG non-state armed group
OAS Organization of American States
SHA suspected hazardous area
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund




Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance 
that has not been used during an armed conflict, that 
has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Aban-
doned explosive ordnance is included under the broader 
category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become 
a party to an international treaty through a single instru-
ment that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can 
be through signature and ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a 
minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and docu-
ment contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been 
applied when the commitment of additional resources is 
considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
an antihandling device “means a device intended to 
protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached 
to or placed under the mine and which activates when an 
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intention-
ally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, 
an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or 
more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an 
antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated 
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the 
process by which a suspected hazardous area is released 
based solely on the gathering of information that indi-
cates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does 
not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process 
by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine 
detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical dem-
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ining equipment) are used to gather information that 
locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. 
Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire 
area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled 
clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive 
hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, 
ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with 
the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/
or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a 
specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the 
removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and 
ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional 
munition that is designed to disperse or release explo-
sive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, 
and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions 
consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from 
the ground or air, the containers open and disperse sub-
munitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are 
typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both. 
Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected 
communities (often rural areas) that are designed to sup-
plement facility-based programs in urban centers. These 
programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, 
and protect human rights for a larger group of people 
with disabilities who have limited access to service, due 
to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and 
limited human resource capacity.
Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence 
of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the 
basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal 
of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, 
clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Con-
vention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants 
of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and aban-
doned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded 
from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identifica-
tion, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of 
explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device – A device placed or pro-
duced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives 
or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device 
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. 
Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban 
Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not. 
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued 
by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action 
by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in 
some cases, defining international requirements and 
specifications.
Information Management System for Mine Action – The 
UN’s preferred information system for the management 
of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA 
provides users with support for data collection, data 
storage, reporting, information analysis, and project 
management activities.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable 
effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and 
suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the can-
cellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduc-
tion of land through technical survey, and the clearance 
of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating 
day-to-day mine action operations, normally under 
the supervision of a national mine action authority. 
Some mine action centers also implement mine action 
activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to 
reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by aware-
ness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including 
public information dissemination, education and 
training, and community mine action liaison.
National mine action authority – A governmental body, 
normally interministerial in nature, responsible for man-
aging and regulating a national mine action program. 
Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor pur-
poses, non-state armed groups include organizations 
carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as 
a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal 
gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of 
data, without the use of technical interventions, about 
the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding envi-
ronment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define 
better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and 
where it is not, and to support land release prioritiza-
tion and decision-making processes through the provi-
sion of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically 
include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking 
information from central institutions and other relevant 
sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area. 
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain 
evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the tech-
nical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, 
the term refers to the risk remaining following the appli-
cation of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 
all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a spec-
ified depth.
Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, 
separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). 
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Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an 
explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and 
have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area – An area where there is rea-
sonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the 
basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, 
using appropriate technical interventions, about the 
presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environ-
ment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define 
better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and 
where it is not, and to support land release prioritization 
and decision-making processes through the provision of 
evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual 
search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or 
full sub-surface search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that 
have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded 
ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for 
some reason failed to detonate.
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW 
explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is 
not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, 
emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabil-
itation, psychological support and social inclusion, eco-
nomic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure 
the full and equal integration and participation of survi-
vors, their families, and communities in society.



